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Foreword
Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin (LDNB) is pleased to publish the
proceedings of its first e-seminar “State’s Role in Private Sector
Development”. This e-seminar was collaboration between the Nepal Study
Center (NSC) of the University of New Mexico and its affiliate Liberal
Democracy Nepal (LDN).
This innovative e-seminar utilized modern technology to bring people
from various locations and continents together and to enable them to
simultaneously participate in the seminar deliberations. We are pleased
that so many accomplished and renowned academics, professionals and
policy makers actively contributed to the seminar from Nepal and the
USA.
The NSC conducts research, undertakes collaborative projects to promote
education, organizes annual policy related conferences, and provides
regular speaking platform for prominent scholars from Nepal and others
who are interested in development in Nepal.
Since its inception in 2005, LDN has been active in promoting academic
and professional deliberations related to the issues of development in
Nepal. LDN’s efforts have included workshop with Nepali leaders and
US organizations, publications of papers, organization of discussions on
timely topics in Nepal, and publishing major papers, commentaries and
articles by prominent Nepali academicians on current issues. LDN has
also collaborated with NSC to organize conferences, talk programs and
discussion forums related to political economy in Nepal.
We are grateful to Ms. Mallika Shakya and Dr. Vijaya Sharma for
moderating this notable e-seminar. The thoughtful paper by Ms. Mallika
Shakya “The State’s Role in Private Sector Development in Nepal”
became the basis for the lively and meaningful discussions that followed.
We also wish to thank all the seminar participants, discussants and
contributors who helped to make this seminar a success. LDN also wishes
to thank its policy group for their support and guidance.
We are grateful to Mr. Bishal KC and Mr. Prakash Adhikari for the
technical support they provided in organizing this seminar. LDN invites
5
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your support in continuing these academic deliberations to help and advise
policy makers, politicians and academicians in Nepal. This e-portal can be
successfully utilized to organize other e-seminars relevant to the rapidly
unfolding events in Nepal.
LDNB will welcome your comments on this publication.
Sincerely
Prof. Alok K. Bohara, University of New Mexico
Dr. Ambika P. Adhikari, Arizona State University
For Editorial Board, Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin (LDNB)

6

Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2007
Foreword
Since its inception two years ago, the Nepal Study Center at the University
of New Mexico has developed and grown remarkably. Through inspired
leadership and by building a network of scholars and thinkers, the Center
has gone uniquely global by tapping into the power of the Internet.
Within this short period of time the Center has published e-journals and
newsletters, has held a highly successful conference at the University of
Wisconsin, and developed an electronic document repository. It has also
been successful in attracting quality students from Nepal to the graduate
program in Economics. The NSC is quickly becoming a focal point for
students and researchers in the University and wider academic community.
One of the remarkable features of the NSC is its use of state-of-the-art
technologies to gather, archive and disseminate information. This eseminar, a first of its kind for the Center, pushes the envelope even further,
bringing ideas and arguments from those all over the world, to those all
over the world.
Through this e-seminar the Nepal Study Center clearly shows its potential
to become a portal for people and ideas to meet, exchange and develop.
Although particularly focussed on issues in the Himalayan region, the
technologies, the methods and the fundamental theoretical ideas have
global significance.
All those involved in this e-seminar should be congratulated and
encouraged to continue this innovative and important work.
Sincerely
Prof. Philip T Ganderton
Professor and Chair,
Economics Department
University of New Mexico
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The State’s role in
Private Sector Development (PSD) in New Nepal
Mallika Shakya 1
Anthropologists, political scientists and historians have often criticized the
tendency of economists to pay inadequate attention to politics and culture
in investigating the operation of societies in general and the process of
economic development in particular. While these are often ignored as
unavoidable interdisciplinary criticisms under normal circumstances; the
politico-economic nexus demands an honest problematisation especially in
times of transition. A discourse on economic development during political
transitions will have little meaning if done in isolation from the discourses
on economic globalization on the one hand and localization of politics and
culture on the other.
Nepal is currently in a deep political, cultural and economic transition.
The popular political uprising Nepal witnessed in April 2006, calling for
an end of the royal autocracy and reinstatement of political pluralism, is
the third major popular uprising the country has witnessed in just over half
a century. The uprising demonstrates Nepal and Nepali’s deep aspirations
and commitment for liberalism and pluralism. A closer look at the
uprising also shows that it is firmly underpinned by a series of
developments and events accumulated over the course of two preceding
decades when Nepal practiced economic and political liberalism.
The political transformations brought in by the April uprising into Nepal’s
political landscape are only the beginnings of a long and winding road to
State-restructuring. At some point, these will have to cross paths with
social and developmental elements in order to be able to deliver on the
popular demands of sustainable peace, social reconstruction, and a rise in
the living standards, which are the three pillars on which State-building
stands. The entwining of transitional politics and economic development
forms the core of this paper. The paper starts with the postulation that the
1

Mallika Shakya is a PhD student at London School of Economics (LSE) currently
working for the World Bank. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author in
her personal capacity, and not necessarily those of the World Bank.

The paper was presented at the LDN/NSC joint e-seminar, February 1-28, 2007. The
author is grateful to the substantial comments provided by the designated discussants.
The paper also benefited from the rigorous virtual floor discussion during February 1628, 2007. The errors remaining are the author’s alone.
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economic and political institutions have a symbiotic relationship in Nepal
as elsewhere. On the one hand, the newly emerging political building
blocks, including those that preach federalism and local autonomy, will
continue to exert influence on the economic equations currently in place.
On the other hand, the political visions will come true and will be
sustained only if they have firm economic underpinnings. This is my
point of departure.
Firstly, the paper and the subsequent e-discussion suggest that the new
political dimensions currently evolving in Nepal cannot be studied in
geographic isolation. The rapidly changing global and regional economic
equations will continue to exert profound influences not only on the
economic aspirations of Nepal and the Nepalis but also on the
maneuvering space available for its economic policy-making. Secondly,
the paper demonstrates that ‘industry’ is not a single concept but an
eclectic one, and the politics-industry nexus in Nepal will continue to take
varied forms across industrial sectors.
I use the term ‘industrial development’ synonymously with ‘private sector
development (PSD),’ and argue that it is central to securing and sustaining
economic growth in post-conflict Nepal. The aim of this paper is NOT to
offer solutions for private sector development in Nepal, but to identify
pertinent issues that must be addressed for a PSD strategy to be
conceptually coherent and pragmatically doable especially at the time of
transition. This paper signposts a number of specific policy measures and
programmatic interventions that have been adopted in other countries
under similar circumstances so as to provide food for thought in initiating
a dialogue in this direction. Subsequently, the paper has benefited from
the e-seminar discussion that took place during February 1-28, 2007,
which had the participation of 55 members from Nepal and the Nepali
diasporas abroad who bring with them deep insights and long experiences
in this field.
A discussion on PSD can be approached in a number of ways. This paper
will take a three-dimensional approach. The first section will introduce
and contextualize the Nepalese private sector in the rapidly transforming
global economics and local politics. The second section will engage in a
more in-depth discussion on the nature and construction of the two pillars
of the Nepalese private sector (i.e., the labor-intensive industries including
the MSMEs and the capital-intensive large sectors) vis-à-vis public policy
measures essential for their well-being. Section 3 will discuss the missing
10
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links between PSD and human/social development. The last section will
summarize the discussion.
1.

Nepal’s private sector development at the crossroads

Nationally, Nepal is at the outset of a historic change. Since May 2006,
we are witnessing a linear evolution – though with inevitable periodic
punctuations – where the building blocks for New Nepal are slowly
beginning to take shape: The first session of the parliament reinstated
after the April uprising called for an ambitious social/gender inclusion
program in favor of the marginalized ethnic, regional and gender groups.
Outside the parliament, the Maoists have called for a draconian
redistribution of economic resources (e.g. land ownership) and
entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g. renewed emphasis on tailor-made FDI
for infrastructure industry and a new vision for the development of micro,
small and medium enterprises) in favor of the marginalized groups. As
the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists proceed towards election
of the constituent assembly amidst intensifying demands for restructuring
of the governance structure – including possibilities of federalism and
regional autonomy – speculations are high that the currently formed
interim parliament and the soon to be elected constituent assembly might
both evolve as the vehicles for intensifying actions towards internalization
of the gender, ethnic and regional issues within the economic and political
policy-making.
Affirmative action and redistribution of resources are not disasters for
capitalism and a market-based economy as is often feared. Contrary, they
can emerge to be unique opportunities for much needed entrepreneurial
change. For example, the post-apartheid government led by the African
National Congress (ANC) in South Africa implemented a draconian Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE) program, which successfully
accomplished an ambitious housing and land redistribution program
towards inclusion of its black population. The State also mandated that all
economic enterprises must ensure significant shares of economic interests
to the black people (BEE Act, 2003). In contrast, the land reform program
in Zimbabwe has invoked wide international criticisms and reports of
misallocation of resources and provocations that are destructive to local
harmony.
After the spates of rebellion and reconciliation, both of which signal clear
gender/ethnic nuances, it is not too early for Nepal’s policymakers
11
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working on PSD to proactively strategize on these fronts. We have
already witnessed how the Maoists’ ‘great leap of nationalism,’ called for
during the second Maoist general convention held in February 2001,
translated into ultra-leftist labor movement, which for the first time
differentiated the labor unions’ treatment of factory owners as per their
ethnicities (Shakya, forthcoming). The Maoist propositions of resources
redistribution and affirmative action are bound to exert direct or indirect
impacts on PSD in the coming months and years. It is important that a
discussion on PSD in New Nepal explores a ‘middle ground’ where
popular concerns about ethnic and gender inclusion are well addressed
without making self-destructive compromises on the market rigor.
At an international level, China and India are not only emerging as the
roaring and shining giants who have begun to flex their muscles in the
global economy; increasingly the interrelationship between the two is
taking form of a strategic alliance than cut-throat rivalry as has been the
case before. This has a number of implications for Nepal: First, there is a
widening avenue for Nepal to seek the role of a jholunge [bridge] between
the two growing economic powers as opposed to its conventional strategy
where it has maintained itself to be the dui dhungako tarul [a buffer zone]
between the two warring giants. Second, as the Chinese and Indian
knowledge-economies increasingly catch up with their financial booms, it
makes all the more plausible that Nepal’s quest for FDI and technology
transfer can be quenched within the region than by turning to far-away
Western multinationals. We are already beginning to learn that successful
bidders for Nepal’s infrastructure construction projects no longer come
from Europe and the North America but from within the region and from
the regional diasporas abroad. Third, as the Indian and Chinese economic
booms give rise to a large middle class with high disposable incomes,
Nepal now potentially has access to a vast international market within the
continental thresholds. Nepal can not only aspire to become the supplier
of the basic commodities for the newly emerging regional middle class,
but should also aspire to be the supplier of energy as well as the luxury
goods, the demands for which are skyrocketing.
Hydropower is a good example of the growing regional demands for
energy. India needs electricity to fuel its economic growth. It is estimated
that India needs to add another 100,000 MW by 2012 and 778,000 MW by
2032 (Dhakal, 2007). Coal reserves are of poor quality and oil and gas
reserves are small. Hydroelectricity is clean and has a special
environmental appeal. The recent economic policies in India have
12
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demonstrated preference for hydroelectricity and have sought to develop a
new economic model, which ends the State’s monopoly in acquisition and
distribution of energy. This is bound to have direct implications for
Nepal.
Nepal is currently standing at the crossroads where it is faced with a series
of opportunities and challenges. Internally, Nepal is caught in a dilemma
between economic liberalism and socialist populism. Internationally, it
has the possibility of choosing between a doomsday of being the dumping
site for its giant neighbors or evolving as a primary beneficiary of the
regional knowledge and capital market boom.
2.

Differentiating the industrial sectors

The discourse on private sector development is an evolving one. Prior to
the 1980s, the nation states all over the third world pursued protectionism
and closely guarded State monopoly at least in the key industrial sectors.
The 1980s and 1990s were the decades of economic liberalization where
economies removed all entry/exit barriers, deregulated their markets, and
liberalized their current and capital accounts. At the turn of the
millennium, the new school of thought now makes case for the role of
‘new’ industrial policy that takes a three-tier approach (Rodrik, 2004). It
argues that, first, the States should ensure an incentive framework that is
economically rigorous and well-disciplined (e.g., fiscal, exchange rate and
trade policies, and the business enabling environment). Second, The State
should then offer appropriate backbone services of physical and technical
infrastructure for the industrial ventures to prosper (e.g., roads, utilities,
business development services and finance). And third, the State should
form partnership with the private sector to build a firm network of proactive institutions, which enhance innovation, coordination, and
productivity among industries so they become and remain competitive in
the global market.
The new industrial policy also makes the case for a differentiated
approach among industries. The economic, political, and social realities in
the ground also mean that one set of industrial policy will not be suitable
for all. For the sake of simplicity, I define my industrial classification as a
dichotomous ‘big’ and ‘small’ pillar of the private sector.
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2.1

The ‘big’ pillar: Building the platform

The ‘big’ pillar of Nepal’s private sector includes components that involve
capital- and technology-intensive sectors such as infrastructure, energy,
financial institutions and universities. It is often the case that Nepalis
play more the role of consumers of the products and services of these
industries than that of the producers, for the simple reason that Nepal lacks
the capital, technology and operational knowledge that these sectors
demand. In such cases, the onus on Nepal’s PSD policymakers is to usher
in foreign capital, either in the form of foreign aid or foreign direct
investment (FDI), but in such a way that they are cost-effective, marketfriendly, and that they do not preempt possibilities of local investment. It
often works better if the investment model is unbundled to clearly
differentiate the public goods from private goods. The former can be
differentiated from the latter on the grounds of gestation period, social
commitments, and the exogenous risks involved.
The biggest FDI challenge, however, is that of technology and knowledge
transfer. Foreign investment must usher in technology and knowledge
transfer, which is not always guaranteed unless the policymakers
especially factor this into account from the very outset of the project
conception. If we are to learn from the blood diamonds from Africa on one
hand and the techno-savvy China on the other hand, the lessons become
clear that FDI is a good servant and a bad master. Policymakers must
restrain from the temptations to patch every problem with a cheap slogan
of nationalism. In the meantime, they must prevent FDI from turning into
an uncontrollable monster.
2.2

The myth of the hydro-electricity panacea

The pioneers of FDI in hydro-electricity generation have vitiated the local
market such that FDI in power sector has now become an anathema within
Nepal. Internationally, the political instability has given such bad name to
investment in Nepal that funds are no longer easy to mobilize. Foreign
grants are desirable but often come with unjustifiable conditionalities that
excruciate project costs. For example, the mid-Marsyangdi project was
funded through German foreign aid, which came with the conditionality
that the FIDIC engineers for the project who estimate all project variation
costs be selected through limited competition among the German
nationals. As a result, a series of variations throughout the project saw the
project cost rise up to USD 5450 per KW, which is one of the highest
14
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among all hydro electricity projects. In contrast, Chilime designated local
expertise for FIDIC duties and secured a production cost as low as 1583
per KW (See Bhattarai, 2007 in e-seminar floor discussion).
Investors from the region or the regional-diasporas abroad are increasingly
proposing the recent private hydropower development projects. They are
better suited to operate in Nepal not only due to their physical and cultural
proximity, but their ability to obtain in-depth information on Nepal’s
political and capital market volatilities. Such detailed information are
often not available to investors from far, and hence their ‘perceived risk’
for investment in Nepal are likely to be estimated higher than the real risk.
In addition, bureaucratic clumsiness, lack of transparency, and
inconsistency in regulatory procedures might further deter far away
investors. Such problems of information asymmetry can be solved
through development of internationally accredited credit-rating and riskrating institutions, combined with regulatory reforms to make
administrative procedures consistent and transparent for all.
While a superior investment climate is a must if the State is to usher in
healthy competition among the investors and seek out the best investment
package, it should also bear in mind that task of hydropower generation is
closely connected with the task of distribution. It is increasingly argued
that regional investors might be better connected not with regional
hydropower generation networks but also the regional distribution
networks. One hopes that the Indian economy’s double-digit growth and
its rising energy consumption need have not gone unnoticed among the
policy makers in Nepal. It is estimated that India needs to add another
100,000 MW by 2012 and 778,000 MW by 2032. Coal reserves are of
poor quality while oil and gas reserves are not very sizeable. The growing
global awareness on environment also adds to the attraction of renewable
hydroelectricity.
Nepal should take special note of the fact that the 2003 amendment of the
Indian Electricity Act offers scope for private participation in energy trade
(Dhakal, 2007). India has increased its involvement in Bhutan’s hydro
sector, and is looking to import gas and electricity from Bangladesh and
Myanmar. It is about time that Nepal lets go its eternal skepticism of
engaging with India on hydro-electricity and explore alternative modalities
to make use of the new avenues India has opened up for its energy market.
The fact that Nepal is working towards developing a new political
equation within the country might offer a good platform through which
15
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Nepal can reposition its dealings with India and China more strategically.
Once the federal structure takes roots in Nepal, it might even consider the
model Bangladesh is currently following for its engagement with the
Indian Northeast. Bangladesh is increasingly distancing itself from the
central State of India while initiating ground-level negotiations with the
regional Indian States to develop distribution networks for its energy as
well as consumer goods. The private sector leaders from both sides of the
border as well as the role of international mediators have been critical in
furthering such relationships (Shakya, 2006b). Nepal could learn from
this new possibility. An economically sound alliance between the private
hydro investors and distributors between Nepal and India might emerge to
be a win-win for both the countries.
While much has been said about the financial and political issues of
hydroelectricity generation; a debate on the issues of technicalities and
modalities of the project is only beginning to evolve. We should begin
with the understanding that hydropower is not an indivisible unit but one
that is eclectic. The success of the infrastructure projects in East Asia and
elsewhere shows us that competition can be boosted, among others, by
unbundling the project into smaller components so the unequal risks of
power generation, connectivity and distribution are separately accounted
for. There is an ongoing debate as to whether or not Nepal can or should
offer merchant power station provisions without a legally binding power
purchase agreement. Such a provision will be feasible once Nepal can
attract multiple investors and generate ample competition in the market.
Investors might be hesitating to come forth also due to the nascent stage of
the financial sector in Nepal, and it will take some time for banks to lend
on pure project financing terms where lending is secured purely by the
underlying cash flow of projects and contracts. Some common credit
enhancement instruments such as direct or indirect guarantees, surety
obligations or insurance can be considered by the commercial banks for
hydro investment.
The e-seminar floor discussion went on to emphasise that there is a crucial
role for an effective public-private-partnership in fostering regulatory and
knowledge management as well as financial facilitation for the
hydroelectricity development in Nepal. The Nepal Electricity Authority
(NEA) appeared to be too bureaucratic and technically challenged a body
to deliver on much of these tasks.

16
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2.3 The ‘small’ pillar on which million Nepalis stand
The ‘small’ pillar of Nepal’s private sector is often a more important one
since it concerns the livelihoods of a larger number of people. The role of
globalization is important even in this strictly ‘local’ pillar of the private
sector because the MSMEs are increasingly serving their global clients
because domestic markets are simply not large enough for a country like
Nepal, especially in the niche areas; and that technology and liberalization
has made global integration very much a ‘local’ reality like never before.
The new industrial policy rightly claims that the ‘new’ market is
increasingly the one beyond the national borders. Nepal can either run the
risk of being inundated by cheap foreign goods from the northern or
southern neighbors who have stronger comparative advantage in both
scale economics (Smith, 1776) and geography economics (Krugman and
Venables, 1995), or it can proactively distinguish its products and seek
competitiveness in selected global niche markets.
In fact, most if not all of the Nepal’s major export come from sectors that
are ethnically or geographically driven, and which pursue niche markets.
Tourism, carpet, and the handicrafts, which occupy over 80 per cent of its
total export, are only few of the examples. Even in the readymade
garments market, which evolved in Nepal largely as a response to the USgranted quota protection, Nepal could compete with Bangladesh and India
only in the sub-sector ‘niche’ of ethnic-contemporary garments (See
Shakya, 2004). Such features infer the significance of brand economics
for a small economy like Nepal.
Although the State has made some haphazard efforts in this direction, the
private sector need for branding is met occasionally by selected business
associations and largely by the firms themselves. Contrary, one sees
rampant misuse of the national brand by the State. Especially in dealing
with cultural capital, the State has not been sufficiently sensitive. A
frequently evoked scenario is that of a Brahman-Chhetri State bureaucrat
trying to promote tourism highlighting the ancient Sherpa heritage and the
pristine Himalayan peaks. Little effort is made to correct for the
bureaucrats’ lack of interest in the nuances of clientele’s needs and a
Brahmans’ unfamiliarity with the Sherpa culture. Another scenario is that
of a non-Newar entrepreneur’s endless efforts to gain access to the
lucrative metal handicraft industry and his failure to break the Newar
clique that currently dominates the market. These are two extreme cases
and the reality is a double-edged sword: On the one hand, traditional
17
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entrepreneurs are deprived of the legitimate opportunities to take part in
modern policy-making and institutional market promotion. On the other
hand, modern entrepreneurs do not have access to the traditional skills that
are essential for capturing the modern niche markets. Macro policies are
often not sufficient to address these archetypal problems that overpower
most of the emerging economies. It is important that the State develops
creative ways to not only enhance such ethnicity-based cultural capital but
also make them accessible to the broader population beyond the ethnic
clique. In many cases, this can be done by giving due recognition to the
ethnicity-based knowledge systems. The newly emerging ethnicitypolitics might have important implications for this aspect of PSD in Nepal.
I emphasize the six key elements of the ‘new’ industrial policy that is
increasingly dominating the post-Washington-Consensus debate on
industrial growth. It argues for two important preconditions to industrial
policy-making: (i) an incentive framework with economically sound
fiscal, exchange rates and trade policies; (ii) infrastructure and backbone
services. It then argues for a succession of institutional interventions,
including:
1.

Access to finance and financial instruments

2.

Institutions for brand economics (innovation, standards &
quality)

3.

Collaboration economics (consortia, industrial clusters, free
zones)

4.

Market promotion agencies

5.

Global supply chain and linkages

6.

Business enabling environment (regulatory & competition
policies)

The new industrial policy spells out the writing on the wall:
Competitiveness based on quality and innovation. With this conviction,
this paper appeals for a case for a timely union between ‘new’ industrial
policy and economic liberalism. Nepal has worked relentlessly in the
early and mid-1990s towards a sound macro policy. Growth has been
meager to say the least. It is perhaps now time for the second leg, i.e.,
getting its industrial policy right.
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A recent World Bank study (2007) on access to finance in Nepal shows
that the household access to banks and credit agencies compare well with
the neighboring countries, the problem area is that of finance for micro,
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Entrepreneurs who want faster
and easier credit opt for informal finance even at much higher interest
rates. Then comes the issue of availability of tailor-made financial
instruments which help foster innovation (venture capital, matching
grants), increase the speed of monetary churning and better facilitate
business transactions (factoring and captive finance), and spread out
transaction risks to level the playing field (shipment finance and trade
insurance).
That Nepal has better competitive advantage in niche products than scale
products needs no convoluted arguing. On the one hand is the argument
for a ‘Gulliver effect,’ referring to the relationship between a small
country and large neighbors where the former is better off producing
higher value added niche products while leaving scale-based activities to
the latter (Blejer and Szapary, 1991). On the other hand is the argument
for commercial capitalization of its rich and diverse ethnic and geographic
legacies to produce ‘distinction’ goods and services (Bourdieu, 1984).
Several booms and busts in our export portfolio have largely involved
niche products such as carpets, handicraft, and pashmina. The booms and
busts within an industrial sub-sector – of the readymade garments – has
inferred Nepal’s failure in scale economics on one hand (Shakya, 2004)
and emerging success in niche ethno-contemporary manufacturing on the
other hand.
Little efforts are made in Nepal to identify which areas have been more
effective in integrating domestic production with global markets. The
literature deems contributions of export promoting agencies and local
collaboration institutions particularly important in higher innovation
sectors. Globally, every dollar invested in a sound export promotion
agency (EPA) is estimated to generate over 300 dollar worth of export.
But this is going to occur only if they effectively engage in core binding
constraints holding export back. In case of Nepal, development and
marketing of culture- and geography-based brands for the global markets
could be an area the EPAs can effectively work on.
The literature on collaboration economics suggests that industrial clusters
push incumbents to upgrade to higher level of quality, innovation, and
technology faster by offering solutions to the coordination failures
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(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). Clusters are an eco-system of firms,
benefiting from synergies created by a dense network of competitors,
buyers, and suppliers. They also include prodders of complementary
products, specialized infrastructure providers, institutions providing
specialized training, education, information, research and technical
support (such as universities, think-tanks, and vocational training
providers) and standards-setting agencies. Successful clusters attract
investment by countering coordination failures, as has been seen in the
cases of leather and garment clusters in various parts of India, salmon
cluster in Chile, technology clusters in Taiwan and Korea, etc. Another
structure often developed to counter coordination failures is the export
processing zones (EPZs), which are often built as experimentations for
specialized infrastructures and regulatory policies and institutions for
market products with greater potentials.
Lastly, the generic well-being of the private sector will depend largely on
the overall climate for doing business. Nepal ranks 100 out of 175
countries in the Ease of Doing Business index (World Bank, 2006).
Within this, a best practice it follows is that it has not set a minimum
capital requirement to start a business. Through the deregulation measures
of the early 1990s and especially the New Industrial Policy 1992, Nepal
has significantly dismantled the Panchayati License Raj and has improved
its procedures for starting a business and enforcing contracts. The
bottleneck lies, however, in the rigid labor regulations that prevent the
industrialists from approaching a flexi-policy to suit the seasonality of his
business. It ranks 150 out of 175 countries in an index measuring labor
flexibility.
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Brand Economics: Cultural Capital
For a country that is opulently blessed with the brand image of summit
Shangri-La and wretchedly deprived of the ores of mass manufacturing,
branding products is much smarter a move than simply scaling up. In a
world where tangible assets and production capacity are in surplus,
brands not only create differentiation and thereby drive consumer
demand, they also create legal and psychological hedges against
competition. Through careful management and skillful promotion,
brands come to exert a powerful influence over consumer behavior.
Nepal has plenty of pieces scattered around to build the brand mosaic:
the mysticism of the Himalayas, the reminiscence of the hippy serenity,
the cradle of Buddhist philosophy and Tibetan arts, the mountain
hospitality, the Gurkha gallantry, and now increasingly the myth of
‘cultural’ communists and the reality of women forest protectors. PR
experts might be able to brand individual products, but there is a clear
role for the State to build a national platform on which individual
products can stage their shows. This requires institution-building – both
formal and informal. Research institutions should explore the market
feasibility; educational institutions should upgrade the quality and
technology; certification institutions should build international credibility
of claims on standards; legal institutions should develop patent
mechanisms; promotion agencies should build bridges between the local
makers and global takers. And collectively, the country should develop a
holistic and long-term strategy on which individual firms can pin their
own brand campaigns.
There are several good examples from India. Its decade-long investment
in classical art academies has given formal accreditation to traditional
heritage and its masters. This, in turn, has made it possible to codify the
art so systematically that these are no longer confined to a tightly knit
social circle but accessible to anyone who is prepared to devote
considerable time and effort. The advantages are two-fold: First, this
adds to the rigor of contestation, and second, it adds to the quality
assurance while continually raising bars of excellence. Modern India’s
ability to create and nurture a national brand significantly owes to the
excellence maintained over centuries and nurtured by its diverse cultural
groups.
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3.
Private Sector role in Public Services: Can there be a happy
marriage?
Over 80 per cent of the Nepali population derives their livelihoods from
agriculture while contributing to about 40 per cent of the GDP. The
agricultural dominance leaves little space for industrial sophistication and
diversification on one hand, and denies a supply chain and linkages that
are necessary for profitably processing and marketing agricultural
products for a rise in productivity on the other hand. Asia as a whole
earns only 6 per cent of its GDP from agriculture because it has migrated
well to better yielding sphere of industries. As we renew the discussion on
the need of a sustainable post-conflict construction, time is ripe to
reinitiate the discussion on how could we bridge the gap between
agriculture and industries to ensure a sustainable growth rate. What role
do micro-credit and co-operatives have in establishing a link between the
rural and urban population?
Studies show that the lack of formal capital and infrastructure in the rural
areas can be partially compensated by creatively utilizing their rich social
capital. The success of collateral-free lending to rural women in
Bangladesh and the success Nepal’s community forestry model has shown
that co-operatives and micro-credit are instruments that have excellent
potentials. Having said this, one does have to remember, however, that
Nepal does carry a long list of donor- and indigenously-led cooperative
programs that have miserably failed not only to sustain but even to take
off.
There are a number of ongoing grassroots-level income-generation
programs in Nepal. NIRDHAN is carrying out micro-credit in several
districts. The Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) has recently scaled up its
outreach. The success of ‘Let us Build Our Own Village’ project, which
paved way for several of other grassroots level projects, indicate that
community mobilization might be the missing formula for Nepal’s mass
transformation. Such programs might in fact be very timely vehicles
through which peace dividend is delivered to the average Nepali in the
shortest possible time span.
There are several other avenues through which peace dividend can be
delivered through constructive mobilization of the private sector to deliver
public goods. The private sector can be mobilized on a competitive basis
to deliver basic social services so as to rid the currently incompetent and
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cost-inefficient State delivery of services. Another modality can even be
that of ‘education vouchers’ whereby the State imposes a modest tax on
private schools to mobilize funds for the graduates of the public schools
for their higher level education.
The current political transition might actually be a good opportunity for
Nepal to come out of its preoccupations and consider a thorough
evaluation of its past cooperative schemes as well as private provisioning
of public services. Such action might renew the rigorous debate among
the local, national and international stakeholders before conceptualizing a
new strategy in this area.
4.

Concluding remarks

The April 2006 people’s movement is the first step in a long process of
State-building. This has several implications for the private sector
development. On one hand, this can be taken as an opportunity to pledge
departure from a bureaucracy-laden ‘business-as-usual’ to adaptation of a
‘new’ and rigorous strategy which would construct the basis on which the
State can effectively lay out its nuts and bolts of equity- and inclusioneconomics without compromising on what might bring the average Nepali
the best chance for a rise in living standards. On the other hand, there
remains a threat that the achievements of the two decades of economic
liberalism gets washed away by radical whims of State interference on the
private sector activities, be it in forms of small-scale extortions and
harassments or in forms of wholesale redistribution of economic resources
and entrepreneurial opportunities that are not economically sound. In
either case, in a largely capitalistic global economic order that currently
envelops Nepal, the private sector development remains at the core of any
discussion on equity, inclusion, and growth.
The April revolution can also be a unique opportunity for the Nepalis to
break the vicious cycle of fatalism and cynicism that has long dominated
Nepali political and economic history. Capturing this opportunity will
require a vision for greasing the nuts and bolts of PSD on various fronts
of: Finance, promotion and incentives, standards and innovation,
commercial capitalization of the cultural capital, logistics and regulatory
environment. Capturing this opportunity will also require a vision for
creative use of the country’s social, cultural, and geographic capital in
addition to the economic capital. This essentially means bringing depth
and precision in the application of the industrial policy: In addition to
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broad macro policies, PSD also needs sound and effective meso policies
and institutional establishments in order to achieve the goals in especially
challenging circumstances. The time is ripe for the PSD policymakers to
develop a strategic grand vision to tackle the nexus between the new and
the old wisdom on the making of industrial policies.
This paper has attempted to offer some food for thought for a discussion
on Nepal’s PSD agenda. The paper commenced by conceptualizing the
contours of Nepal’s private sector against a South-Asia-wide politicoeconomic context. It then identified a number of structural and sectoral
components that are essential for the development of Nepal’s eclectic
private sector. In addition to the issue of access to finance and financial
instruments, these components include the issues of promotion and
incentives for innovation and branding, technology transfer, and
regulatory environment. Finally, the paper briefly outlined the scope for
the private sector in delivery of public services and in enhancing social
equity.
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Discussants’ Comments - 1
Dr. Bhola Nath Chalise
Chairperson
Board of Directors
Rastriya Banijya Bank
The philosophical foundation of the paper presented is the socialism of the
West especially those of Nordic and Continental Europe. The socialists in
Nepal propound that these countries have reached this level of
development through socialism but forget that the foundation of their
development was laid by innovative entrepreneurs of the 18th and 19th
centuries under capitalism. Modern day socialism in the West has
restricted the growth in the developing countries through protectionism,
control on free flow of goods, services and manpower globally. While
talking about PSD, someone should start with a notion of ‘no role for the
State in private sector development.’ States – be in developed world or
underdeveloped – are there to coerce but not to develop the nation. In a
typical developing country like Nepal policy interventions are translated
into permissions, license, quota, cartel, etc. Implementation of these will
become paradise for the nexus of politicians, bureaucrats and business
people for corruption and distributing favors to their kith and kin.
Ms. Shakya is in favor of two concepts for ‘new’ industrial policy for
Nepal: special economic zones and export promotion agency (most
probably in the Government sector!). The experiences of SEZs have
already proved that they are not effective in highly regulated and protected
economies like India in the 1980s due to bureaucratic hassles, and they are
of no use in an open free economy. Switzerland does not have any SEZ
and Hong Kong and Singapore did not care about these. A country like
Nepal, which does not have substantial industries to protect, can declare
the whole country a SEZ by applying a single rate of 5% tariff on all
imports (Nepal has about 10% average tariffs now). Industrialists in Nepal
tell in private conversations that the costs involved in getting duty draw
back is more than 10 per cent of the amount depending on its scale. They
are more than willing to pay 5 per cent tariff rather than wait for more
costly duty draw back system. Marketing is a very skilful profession,
which needs involvement of highly motivated individuals. Marketing in
foreign countries (exports) is still more demanding and costly. How can
lowly paid government-appointed officials of the export promotion
agencies sell domestic products in international markets?
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Ms. Shakya emphasizes the government to focus on labor-intensive
policy. From an economist’s point of view there are only two types of
technologies: efficient and inefficient. Any technology that uses more
resources (capital or labor) per unit of product than its competitors is
inefficient. If the market is distorted by foreign exchange controls and
restricted labor laws, then government needs interventions for labor
intensive policies. If the market is left without such distortions, then
entrepreneurs themselves will use more labor if it is less expensive than
capital.
In Nepal today we have lot more leftists available than necessary. Out of
the eight parties active in Nepal six are declared communists and two
remaining ones believe that only socialism can bring prosperity here. The
dose of extra state interventionist policy will be too much to swallow for a
liberal who believes only on a system of individual liberty, limited
government and true decentralization. The miniscule of liberals in Nepal
have to work hard to face the attack from the Nepali left in the West,
especially from the ‘full bright Marxist’ and the ‘Keynesian left’. Forget
about attack within Nepal.
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Discussants’ Comments - 2
Mr. Krishna Gyawali
Joint Secretary
Ministry of Finance
1. While sitting with the computer to write belated comments on
MallikaJi’s well-articulated and substantial paper on PSD, my eyes
caught the following news reports of the day:
•
•

•

Up to seven hours of nationwide power cut a day which will reportedly
continue for at least four more months;
Garbage dumped everywhere in the city is left uncollected for over a
week, over a row between Kathmandu metropolis and the local
residents of Okharpauwa in Nuwakot district which is being developed
as the primary dumping site; and
FNCCI says the recent 29-day terai unrest caused a loss of over one
trillion rupees to the nation’s economy.
This is an indicative ground reality of the country. But this should not
deter us from debating and dreaming about New Nepal’s PSD vision.
In fact, these crises have made people so much aware of the problems
and potential of the country’s development that it would now be
impossible for the policymakers to ignore and dismiss their voices and
grievances. Political awakening has led to socio-cultural and economic
vigilance of the people, which, if mobilized with supportive policy
back-up with clear vision and direction, would help strengthen and
sustain political and economic democracy in post-conflict Nepal.

2. The paper rightly stresses on sustainable economic growth as one of
the three issues to be addressed in the aftermath of the popular
movement and, as a way to attaining this, attaches great significance to
PSD. The author’s adoption of the three-dimensional approach to
analysing PSD issue in Nepal is sensible, in that it has made the paper
well-structured and focused. Taking the national scenario into account,
her citing the success of BEE in South Africa to offset the trade-off
between efficiency and equity is inspiring, though it would require a
strong and united government and credible and efficient private sector.
The Maoists’ economic agenda announced only the other day does not
give us a clearer picture as to how they will envision PSD, and their
silence on FDI is especially tricky and even discouraging.
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3. At the international level, the Paper rightly re-defines the role Nepal
can play as a transit point between its two economic giants, described
metaphorically as jholunge. The paper correctly argues that Nepal can
and should benefit from the success of its immediate and regional
neighbors, mainly for the FDI and technology transfer, by overcoming
the dilemma of policy reversal, and should carefully craft a strategy to
optimize its potential through focusing on its comparative advantage.
4. The paper has made a distinction between the ‘big’ and ‘small’ pillars
of the private sector and argued that the former, rather than the latter,
should seek FDI as a supplement rather than the substitute for local
investment. The author’s suggestion to the policymakers that a
‘rigorous national learning system’ is required to prevent FDI turning
into a unbridled monster is good, but needs to be sincerely followed by
the local entrepreneurs and investors as well. Regarding the ‘small’
pillar, i.e. the MSMEs, I agree with her concept of capitalizing on
‘niche’ areas to make them look comparatively attractive, rather than
seeking unrealistic competition in price and quantity with the
neighbors. Her showcasing the notion of ‘cultural capital’ for Nepal’s
industrial resurgence is also very convincing.
5. On the whole, the paper is good at exploring and analyzing the issues
that trigger the State’s role in PSD in new Nepal. It attempts to touch
upon many aspects including the role of cooperatives and MFIs as a
missing link between agriculture and industries, and cites studies done
by the World Bank to highlight how Nepal fares in doing business in
the world. The conclusion that the country should now depart from a
‘bureaucracy-laden business-as-usual’ approach to a ‘new and
rigorous’ strategy should also be taken positively by the PSD
policymakers. However, we need to practically sit on the ground and
start thinking of what that ‘new and rigorous’ strategy precisely
means. For example, following through a ‘linear’ approach of
policymaking and implementation, we have enacted so many laws
relating to PSD (we have scored better than our neighbors in the region
on legal front). We have joined WTO much earlier than many of our
LDC counterparts and promised to comply with all of the obligations.
We have policy pronouncements on PSD in each periodic plan and
budget speeches. We have speedily embarked on privatization, with
already 26 public enterprises transferred to the private sector. But the
impact has not been positive so far at a macroeconomic level although
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there has been a sharp increase in the shares of non-agricultural sector
in the GDP over the past decade or so.
6. To conclude my observations, if we intend to bring this e-seminar to a
practical conclusion, we need to lobby to make sure there are a) a
clearly and consensually drafted PSD strategy as a part of the 3-year
Interim Plan that is underway in the NPC; b) a stable, competent and
professionally sound bureaucracy, especially within the key economic
ministries such as MOICS and MOF; c) a credible and confident
private sector inclusive but not confined to business associations such
as FNCCI and CNI; and d) a stable and liberal political environment.
For all this to happen, we should continuously strive for
mainstreaming economic development agenda into the political
landscape of the country, and let economic agenda receive its due
place in the whole scheme of the things. The euphoria that electing a
constituent assembly in itself would resolve all problems is misleading
and should be wiped out.
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Discussants’ Comments - 3
Mr. Sujeev Shakya
President
Tara management Pvt. Ltd.
The comments provided are adding to perspectives to private sector
development in Nepal rather than providing solution-oriented
prescriptions.
Defining Private Sector in Nepal: When we talk of Private Sector
Development in Nepal, we ought to first get the definition of private sector
in Nepali context examined. Nepali private sector is not a cluster of
industrialists or conglomerates, but of individuals, enterprises who have
clustered businesses of arbitrage and opportunity. It is not about creating
core competencies thereby having competitive and comparative
advantage, but more by using strategies that would upgrade the rentseeking behavior to look like business. For instance, the private sector in
the airlines industry does more about leveraging credits on oil, lease
rentals and bank credits rather than developing core competencies that can
take the airline across the borders. Therefore when they fail, they fail
more miserably than the state carrier. Therefore, when we refer to private
sector development we need to understand that it is not development of
fly-by-night operators who change businesses from cloves to computer
hard disks and mobile phones and back to cardamom within a year, but of
private businesses that would like to develop competencies to take one’s
business regional and perhaps global one day. We need to examine the
impediments from these perspectives.
The private sector in Nepal suffers from lack of professional dignity. For
example, it is hardly believed that an entrepreneur does business to make
profits and to offer larger societal contributions. When one launches a
hotel project, everyone talks about how much money the promoter is
going to make in land transfer and construction contracts, and not how
much the project would contribute to employment or tourism. Therefore, it
is important to examine development of private sector in the context of
businesses that would like to strive to create employment and core
competencies along with being able to share their successes by partnering
with the general public.
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We are in an already confused state of definition of enterprise or of the
right of doing business because of the unclear views of the Maoists. P K
Dahal, B Bhattarai and company have offered no words for private sector
development. If one cannot own land as freehold or get the security over
leased land, the enterprises’ functions on such land can never be
sustainable. Security of land ownership is fundamental right for
businesses. Unfortunately, other political parties have nothing better to say
too. Erstwhile politicians have only seen businesses as revenue targets
who have to be doled favors for the bucks they provide. A sahu
[merchant] is source of funds for the political parties and an option to get
jobs to near and dear ones who cannot be put forced upon government
corporations. The business community has also used this nexus beautifully
and the mecca for business people has been the stage of seminars and
workshops where they can hobnob with the politicians. So, starting a trade
association and desire of reaching the coveted positions in the
associations, chambers and federations have overtaken the hunger for
building competencies and business expansions. When one looks at the list
of such individuals, one will seldom find any new businesses added by
these individuals in the last one decade. Like the worker who would spend
his/her time and energy to become a union leader rather than doing a
better job and rising higher, the businessman gets stuck in the quagmire of
politics.
While it is important that policies as indicated by Ms Shakya be
implemented by the government, it is also important to see how the
defined private sector graduates to the hunger of business success.
Changing the Thinking
Ms Shakya’s recommendation of the writing on the wall of “quality,
innovation and export competitiveness” has to be surely taken seriously
along with thinking of Nepal as land-linked rather than land-locked.
Nepal needs to have its own Havana Cigar or Swiss Chocolates or watches
that identify us with the product. With a pseudo-militant labor force, it will
be difficult to run industries with large deployment of human resources.
Therefore, clusters of small ‘niche product’ producers can go behind a
brand that is managed by an international firm with the competencies of
doing so.
Regarding the statement highlighted in the paper that co-operatives could
be the missing link, we need to again redefine co-operatives. There are
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more than ten thousand co-operatives currently operating in the financial
sector in Nepal, but very few of these seek broader integration of financial
services and access to finance. Most of them tend to stay out of the ambit
of the regulations of the Nepal Rastra Bank. Some of these co-operatives
are promoted by ‘pillars of the Nepali private sector’ and larger than
finance companies. We need to therefore get a bit specific when we look
for definition of the ‘genuine co-operatives’.
Looking at Private Sector through the eyes of Private Sector
Non-private sector institutions have done successive studies in Nepal on
the private sector. To take an example, in India the Confederation of
Indian Industries (CII) has conducted many studies and institutions, e.g.,
NASCOM has changed the face of IT business in India. Unfortunately
there are no studies on the private sector done by private sector institutions
in Nepal. This void has made understanding private sector development
difficult. Further, with most of the good human resources in Nepal being
attracted by development agencies rather than private sector (directly
contrary to what happens elsewhere in the world), there is a serious lack of
capability within the private sector to think of development of the sector.
We have bilateral and multilateral organizations whose objectives are not
doing business, but which advise in their own way how businesses ought
to be done; that has also created much confusion. Perhaps, the multidimensional agenda that Ms Shakya has raised in her paper needs private
sector champions to take the ideas, test them, and put to fruition.
In conclusion, many people disagree to the concept that to tackle poverty,
wealth has to be created. But this may be the only option left for a country
that has seen violence, exclusion and social disparity. The creation of
wealth is the business of private sector and as Nepali private sector
graduates from individual ‘myopic sahus’ to largely held efficient global
businesses with many constituent shareholders we can look at reducing
poverty to a large extent in the emerging Nepal.
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Discussants’ Comments – 4
Dr. Vijaya R. Sharma,
Faculty,
Economics Department, University of Colorado
In this note I focus on the need of strengthening the role of the private
sector in export and investment promotion and in technology and skill
development programs. Since the economic liberalization that began in
1992 with changes in industrial policy, foreign investment policy, and
trade policy, governmental and semi-governmental agencies have been
entrusted the tasks of promoting exports and industrial investment. Private
sector agencies like the Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (FNCCI), the Chamber of Commerce, the garment
manufacturers’ association, and the carpet manufacturers’ association have
barely been given any significant role. Their representation in Trade
Promotion Board, Industrial Promotion Board, One-Window System,
Industrial Enterprise Development Institute, and National Productivity and
Economic Development Center is either nil or minimal.
Reforming macroeconomic policies and improving business environment
are important, but also important are the functions of disseminating
information on business climate, exploring and developing export markets,
providing services to potential investors and exporters, and advocating and
lobbying for policy changes. Experiences of countries like Hong Kong,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Ireland suggest that these functions are likely to
be more efficiently executed by private sector agencies than governmental
agencies.
The private sector is the final user of the services of promotional agencies,
and it more intimately knows the dynamics of the market. Therefore,
relative to private sector, governmental and semi-governmental agencies
are likely to do a poorer job of identifying the areas, sectors, and products
that need to be prioritized for optimal allocation of budgetary expenses for
export and investment promotion. Also, governmental agencies have to
operate within government rules that lack the necessary flexibility of
quickly adapting to changes in market conditions. An even bigger
limitation of a governmental agency is its work culture; the officials tend
to behave more as regulators than facilitators. There are often inter-agency
rivalries and clashes among government line agencies on perceived
encroachment of authority of one agency by another. The above
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limitations adversely affect the efficacy of promotional programs run by
governmental agencies.
It may be desirable to create a privately run institution for export and
investment promotion. To make such an institution effective and credible
to the prospective investors and importers, (1) the institution needs to be
constituted under a separate charter, (2) it should be led by a reputed
person from the private sector who is appointed by the prime minister, (3)
its board of directors should compose of representatives from private
sector trade and manufacturers’ associations and from related
governmental agencies, (4) it needs to be supported with grants from the
government, (5) it needs to have a periodic oversight of the government in
the form of representation in the board and in the form of financial and
performance audits, and (6) it needs to be permitted to charge fee for its
services. Such a proposal will necessitate reconfiguration of institutions
like Export Promotion Board, Trade Promotion Center, Industrial
Promotion Board, and One-Window System.
Nepal’s manufacturing base and export products are characterized by a
very low technological level of production. There is almost total absence
of firm-based skill or technological development programs. There is also
an apparent mismatch between the needs and demands of the industrial
sector and programs of various governmental agencies that are engaged in
science, technology, and skill development, like RONAST, RECAST,
Food Research Laboratory, Royal Drugs Research Lab, skill training
programs of the Department of Labor and the Department of Cottage and
Small Industries, etc. A three-pronged approach may be necessary in this
regard: (1) Provide incentives to firms for targeted and in-firm skill
development, apprenticeship, technology adaptation and innovation. (2)
Involve FNCCI, subsector associations, and private industry on planning,
designing, and developing schools and training programs for generating
middle-level technical human resources, by enrolling high school
graduates and imparting them one and two-year courses that are directly
applicable to the industry. Nepal may learn from experiences of other
countries like Chile. (3) Facilitate import and transfer of technology and
conduct programs of productivity improvement through FNCCI and/or
industry associations.
Finally, in the light of fact that Nepal is embarking on a federal system of
governance, some of the functions of the central government may be
transferred to provincial governments. Such likely functions could be the
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above-mentioned in-firm skill development programs, the technical
schools for mid-level technicians, and also policy issues related to
agriculture development and land reform.
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Discussants’ Comments – 5
Prachanda Man Shrestha
Joint Secretary
Ministry of Industries, Commerce and Supplies
On the economic agenda of Nepali political leadership:
•

Certainly, private sector development is one of the most relevant and
pertinent issues, especially in the present context that Nepal going
through a major turmoil brought in by the popular political movement.
We, therefore, have to assess this topic in the context of the agendas
brought forth by politicians in their endeavours of State-building and
restructuring.

•

As mentioned in the paper presented, Nepal has witnessed three major
political movements within half century but there still seems to be
uncertainty on the policy measures needed for an economic delivery.
FNCCI’s stand was weak throughout the recent April movement, and
it lacked clarity over whether it was supporting or opposing the
movement.

•

The reason for such a lack of clarity could be two-fold: First, the
Nepalese private sector was reluctant to embrace the dynamic changes
and they seemed to prefer to cling on to the privileges they received in
the status quo. And second, the political leaders have not been driven
by the economic agenda and they lack conceptual clarity on the role of
private sector in the process of State-building.

•

The aftermath of the past political movements have shown that the
politicians tend to prioritize short-term, populist, and vote-bankoriented policy actions over longer-term sustainable productive
systems aiming to encourage private sector investment boosting
economic growth.

•

This makes it very clear that the sustainability of peace with political
stability in the country depend largely on the national consensus on the
universal question of equity versus growth. In Nepal, the equity
argument has been put ahead of growth, owing to policymakers’
adherence to popular political slogans at the expense of rational policy
manoeuvres.
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•

Therefore, this time, for sustained peace and stability to institutionalise
in the country, economic growth is to be made the primary agenda in
State-building and in strengthening of the economic system alongside
equitable distribution. Private sector development can and should draw
needed attention of policy makers.

•

A compromise between growth and equity can only be the creation of
employment in the country. Therefore, all the national policies must be
directed in an integrated way towards creating jobs in all segments and
all tiers of the society – be it in manufacturing, services, agro-based
industries or technology-based activities. The policy choice should
neither be merely between labor-intensive or capital-intensive, nor
between domestic or foreign investment, nor between large-scale or
small-scale enterprises.

•

In the same way, we should not keep on doing the merry-go-round in
the name of inclusiveness and exclusiveness but create and provide
works and jobs for all Nepalis in all parts of the country enabling all to
be economically productive. Economic engagement for their share of
return to uplift their standard in life is to be the bottom-line of any
policy discourse.

•

Particularly after the failure of command economy, it is accepted
globally that business is not to be done by governments. Governments
have several other roles to take. Non-government agencies doing
business for profit are the private sector. Therefore, government’s
responsibility of economic growth is to be discharged through the
efficient functioning of private sector. Government must succeed in
getting the desired outcome of economic growth through private sector
performance. The only instrument left for the government in this
direction is through the pragmatic policy strategy and its effective
enforcement which are reflected in the form of:
o regulatory and institutional mechanism to guide, control and
monitor the private sector business,
o incentive provisions to encourage private sector for investment,
innovation and overall entrepreneurship,
o supportive measures creating physical infrastructures,
negotiating for external market access, promoting for market
opportunities,
o facilitative measures for access to capital, technology, and skill
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o protective measures for risk minimization and competitiveness
through macro-economic stability and enabling environment.
Therefore, the role of government in delivering economic output is
relatively indirect and requires respect for the market mechanism. It
has been obvious in getting priority of social agenda over economic
agenda in countries of poverty and deprivation including Nepal.
On technical aspects of the private sector development strategy:
•

The private sector in Nepal is still at the primary stage of development
from the perspective of corporate culture and management, and not
very well organized for a strong and coordinated advocacy to influence
the State policy. Private sector consultation and input for policy
formulation are still ad hoc, uninstitutionalized, and voluntary.
Therefore, the Private Sector Development Strategy, first, has to take
into consideration institutionalization of the consultation process in
economic policy formulation in order to build confidence among the
private sector actors.

•

Private sector development needs stability in state policy particularly
at macro-economic and sectoral levels in order to let the investors feel
safe on their investments and reliability on the incentives. Due to
political instability in the country during the past, credibility of the
State has substantially eroded. The new leadership is bound to face
some challenges in regaining credibility when they will announce their
new policies irrespective of its merits.

•

Although majority of people in Nepal are engaged in agricultural
farming, they have not yet been able to consider themselves as being
in business or being entrepreneurs. The farming activity is long
considered more of a livelihood activity than a commercial or
entrepreneurial activity. A private sector development strategy has a
critical role in recognizing the importance of a major force within the
private sector. There is a large scope for developing a major program
in the agricultural enterprise sector that would develop regular
business support services as well as specialized institutions offering
services on hedging, grading, cleaning, packaging, and labelling.

•

One more step is the support in adding intangible value based on
ethno-culture-heritage and geography both in agro-based and industry39
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based products from Nepal to fetch prime price in regional and
international markets. I fully agree with the paper that Nepal’s
comparative advantage lies on niche products. However branding such
products for premium price in external market is beyond the capacity
of domestic private sector. It is where the strategy must focus on the
role of multi-national companies that would help establish global
linkages that would usher in the benefits of globalization.
•

State role is still very much needed in Nepal in investing in a massive
way in building physical infrastructure, particularly transportation,
communication, and energy. Without cost-effective availability of
these basic infrastructures, the private sector cannot be competitive in
production.

•

Nepal’s geographical location between the two fastest growing largest
economies of the world means that the policy strategy has to
especially focus in benefiting from the economic spill-overs from the
process of economic integration between China and India, which is
bound to take place as they consolidate the sustenance of their growth.
Nepal’s strategy should be to make use of the cross-border integration
even in the production processes, e.g., flow of goods, services,
technology, and investment. This can be achieved through a closer
integration of the Nepalese private sector actors with those from China
and India. The brand of Himalayan products could be of great interest
to both China and India, where they can share the supply and value
chain as per their individual comparative advantages and market
absorption capacities.

•

In the context of Nepal’s recent popular movement, awaiting the
formation of the interim government with participation from all parties
including revolutionaries, private sector development heavily depends
on the state guarantee to protect domestic as well as foreign
investment and role of political parties in balancing interest of their
trade unions to the comfort of investors in business enterprises for
their competitiveness.
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Discussants’ Comments – 6
Mr. Jagadish Upadhyay
Independent Consultant
(Retd) World Bank
Ms. Mallika Shakya’s paper aims to identify pertinent issues that must be
addressed for a PSD strategy …..at this transitional situation ….NOT to
offer solutions. This note summarizes my views on the most important
issues and opportunities.
The Background
Nepal experienced significant all-round improvements in economic and
human development between 1995-96 and 2003-2004. The incidence of
poverty fell from 42 to 31 percent. Health and education outcomes
improved, particularly for girls and people living in remote areas 2 . Such
findings, of the National Living Standard Survey of 2003/04, show that
Nepal made considerable economic progress even during the twelve years
of conflict. However, Nepal’s economy grew only by 2.7 to 3.8 percent
between 2003 and 2005, compared to 7.7 to 7.9 percent average for South
Asia, and by the declining rates of 2.7 percent in 2004/05 and 1.9 percent
expected in 2005/06. 3
The recent peace accord with the Maoists provides new hopes to move
ahead more vigorously. Most countries have accelerated growth through
private sector development (PSD). What are the main hindrances and the
opportunities for Nepal?
Main Issues
Political Factors. Conducive political climate is a fundamental
prerequisite. Ms. Shakya’s paper recognizes this but seems much more
optimistic than might be warranted. The Maoists’ participation in
competitive politics could prove to be a HUGE wishful thinking. The first
question is how will the Maoists behave if they lost the next election
considering that they went to the jungle when they lost the last time?
Secondly, what will be the Government’s attitude if Maoists came to
power or shared power in a coalition? The Maoists have been openly
2
3

Resilience Amidst Conflict, the World Bank, Asian Bank and DFID, 2006.
Economic Survey 2005/06, Ministry of Finance.
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announcing that the agreement with other parties was only a stepping
stone to achieve a full-fledged communism.
Their leaders have
denounced private ownership of properties. Will a Maoist Government
behave like the Chinese, the West Bengal Communists or the Cubans?
Will there be other possible political conflicts, like the recent Madhesi
protests?
Institutional and Governance Factors. A recent story in the Economist
(February 3-9, 2007) starts as follows: Once upon a time, not so long ago,
there was a poor continent. Its name was Europe. Then it discovered three
things: the free market, the rule of law and science-based technology. Now
it is rich....simplistic perhaps, but the same thing happened in North
America, with the same consequences, and it is now happening in Asia...
Ms. Shakya cites that Nepal ranked 100 out of 175 countries in Ease of
Doing Business Index. The Government too admits that: Investments
could not be attracted due to lack of legal and institutional framework for
the protection of investments, inflow and repatriation of capital, flexible
labor policy, and standard accounting and auditing system in place for
ensuring good governance in the private sector4.
Nepal can radically alter the situation and stand out in the area. All South
Asian countries lag significantly in dealing with private sector. Nepal, as
a smaller country, has advantage over larger countries. India’s experience
can greatly help in developing institutional framework or rules. I wonder
if an internationally participated watch-dog body could be established in
Nepal to guarantee efficient implementation of a trustworthy PSD
mechanism which will be fair and completely free from red tape. This
could provide Nepal with that “niche factor” needed to compete in the
global market, attracting entrepreneurs from India and other countries.
(Of course, there could also be other potential niche products like
hydropower, tourism, tea, herbs, etc.)
India/China Factor. I agree with Ms. Shakya that Nepal could benefit
immensely by acting like a jholunge [bridge] between two economic
giants, shining India and roaring China, instead of maintaining the old
thinking of yam between rocks. Nepal could largely meet her quest for
FDI and technology transfer without turning too far. But Nepal must
make efforts to maximize FDI and technology transfer through smart
4

Economic Survey, 2005/2006, Ministry of Finance.
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fiscal policies, no red tape PSD environment and continued good
economic relationship with neighbors. For example, competing with India
will be more difficult in most areas but Nepal can involve influential
Indian entrepreneurs in her private sector and use their goodwill to
preserve Nepal’s interests just like US traders lobby for overseas
suppliers.
Manpower Export. Manpower export and remittances will continue to be
extremely important for Nepal for the foreseeable future. This is important
for employment, income generation for relatively poor populations, to
meet Nepal’s balance of payments and for the liquidity needs of the
economy. This can also prepare workers for more productive work when
they return. In recent years, manpower export to third countries (other than
India) has grown very significantly, especially to the Middle East and East
Asia. The remittances have grown from 3 percent in 1995/96 to over 12
percent in 2004/05. The following data during the first eight months of
2004/05 demonstrate the importance 5 :
Workers remittances: NRs 36,060 million
Gorkha remittance: NRs. 1,996 million
Total goods export: NRs 36,948 million
Export of manpower must, therefore, be facilitated properly through the
establishment of training facilities to enable better income, through
improved recruitment management to prevent exploitation by bad
contractors, and by establishing efficient and trustworthy remittance
facilities to prevent cheating by unscrupulous middlemen.

5

Economic Survey, 2004/05, MOF.
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Discussants’ Comments – 6
Dr. Mukti P. Upadhyay
Associate Professor
Economics Department, Eastern Illinois University
Many minds in Nepal are occupied, and rightly so, with the question of
how to reorient political structure in the country. Sustained economic
development requires a stable political system. Meanwhile how to create a
durable basis for development in the new Nepal must also be thought
through. It is refreshing to see Ms. Shakya thinking about development of
the private sector in new Nepal in this context. There is a serious concern
in some quarters that the Maoists might succeed in acquiring much of
political power after a new constitution is written and a new election held.
In that case, the argument goes, the role of the private sector will be
severely curtailed. We continue to hope, on the other hand, that democracy
is here in Nepal to stay. What role should the private sector then have in
development? In particular, how should things change from the way they
are now?
There is a lot in this paper with which I agree. Here, however, I focus
more broadly on a few things that I think need further elaboration and
emphasis. Is the model of development Nepal has been trying to follow
since 1991, for instance, an appropriate one for future or does it need a
major change? In the dimension of private sector economic activity, I do
not think that the broad contours of the existing model need a fundamental
transformation. This includes the rights to private property. A new model
will have to change, however, in the way it addresses gross inequality of
political and economic power existing today. The heightened awareness of
the plight of the poor and underprivileged makes it almost mandatory for
the state to provide them some support and enable them to exercise their
political rights.
The paper proceeds with the presumption that the new government will
drop all hostilities to the private sector. During the period of transition to
an evolving new order, I feel it needs repeating that having too many
regulations and controls will stifle private business. Nepal made major
advances in the early 1990s to emphasize clearly that it is individuals and
businesses rather than the government that would serve as the engine of
growth. Reducing the regulations and protection of inefficient import-
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competing industries were some good examples of the policies taken at
that time. Carrying this perspective forward would seem to be essential.
As an example, greater labor market flexibility may be required to boost
growth of private investment. Yet it may be particularly difficult to relax
labor laws in Nepal if social demands to protect poor workers from
“unscrupulous” businesses are carried too far. This is one of the important
issues that policymakers in India have also not been able to resolve. To get
around the prevailing labor and tax regulations, many developing
countries have set up free trade zones (FTZs) or export processing zones
(EPZs). Malaysia, China, and Kenya are but a few good examples of
significant growth through EPZ manufacturing. Development of
infrastructure and accumulation of human capital in local labor are some
of the prerequisites for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in EPZs
and, more strongly so, elsewhere in the country. Nepal may have a long
way to go in that direction. But sooner the country realizes that a thriving
industrial sector is not feasible without FDI in the country’s low cost
resources, the better. One can simply look at Mauritius, a country that was
termed a case of Malthusian trap at the time of independence. By early
1980s, the open trade and investment policies, and tax preferences were
combined with the maintenance of near equilibrium exchange rate and the
removal of special favors given earlier to public enterprises. By the mid1990s, Mauritius had emerged as the seventh in a group of 15 consistently
growing exporters of manufacturing among low and middle income
countries, outperforming such stellar exporters as Thailand and Portugal.
Going back to basics, a problem that must be tackled by the new
government in Nepal is how to reduce uncertainty and encourage risktaking. Much of institutional evolution necessary for efficient management
of risks is a slow process. For example, breaking the status quo can be
difficult in any regime including democracy. Indeed, windows of
opportunities for a rapid change may be available sometimes. A new
government formed after a large victory in elections can often go in that
direction. Yet political leadership may be loath to make such a move. The
people that advocate transparency in government during elections may fall
for personal gains to be made from the continuation of old policies. The
problem is that situations like this can create or sustain uncertainty that
becomes hard to remove for a long time.
Uncertainty dooms growth by constraining investment. It is usual for firms
to work with risks in business because often the probability distribution of
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returns is known or can be estimated. Uncertainty, however, takes away
much of the basis on which decisions can be made. During the Panchayat
regime, removal of uncertainty in industrial and commercial policy was a
regular demand of the business community. Yet the groups that controlled
political power had no incentive to remove the status quo. This shows
once again that we must start raising transparency in government to align
the private incentives of rulers with public interest. Once again, we must
reform institutions to emphasize administrative and legal efficiency to go
along with the soon to be established political superstructure.
The paper indicates how Nepal can profitably concentrate on the
production of “smart” goods such as specific types of garments. The need
is to identify many more of the goods that reflect current comparative
advantage, either based on an abundance of specific resources such as
unskilled labor or some natural resource. A WTO study describes how a
recent experience of a herbal medicine company in Nepal, Gorkha
Ayurved, has shown a critical need for quality assurance which the
government regulatory bodies must establish to increase access to export
markets. As is well known, Nepal should have a clear relative advantage
in medicinal and aromatic products because of its rich biodiversity.
Improvements in quality standards and FDI inflows in this industry could
help to capture a share of the rapidly growing world demand in this
market.
For long-term development of the country, however, what matters is the
emergence of new products and processes that indicate dynamic
comparative advantage of the country. Such products are hard to predict
years in advance. Thus, rather than intervening in the product markets
directly, policy should be geared to creating an environment where the
risk-taking ability of entrepreneurs and the productivity of workers can
increase on a sustained basis. That probably is the only way to escape
productivity stagnation that is bound to set in gradually in many of the
goods in which the country has comparative advantage today.
Attracting large FDI is difficult in Nepal in the short run. Why not invest
more in exploring large FDI inflows from India? Of all the foreigners, the
Indians are in the best position to take advantage of opportunities offered
by Nepal’s economic and non-economic resources and policy. Investors
from India will also have easier access to the vast Indian market for
Nepal-made products. Finally, FDI from India should also help in giving
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signals to third country investors about good investment prospects in
Nepal.
Turning inward, what can the country do in its domestic sectors? The
services have grown much more rapidly in Nepal than sectors producing
goods. Expansion of finance, health, and education mainly in the urban
areas has been a leading factor in the growth of services. Though hit
sharply by political instability, tourism still holds immense potential for
growth once lasting peace returns. The poor investment climate in industry
has made trade more lucrative than manufacturing where investments are
lumpy and returns may be uncertain. This is not, however, a problem
because if growth through private investment is a main strategy of
development, funds will flow to wherever the expected return is high. It is
the job of policy to reorient the incentive structure, and to reduce the risks
involved, if possible. But the policy should reflect long-term development
priorities and should only change when such priorities do.
Can Nepal arrive at a political consensus on pro-business policy that
consistently encourages the use of abundant national resources? Malaysia,
Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia prospered since the 1960s not
because they all adopted authoritarian regimes for decades. Their progress
owed much to a powerful hand of the state that provided basic
infrastructure, and guided and nurtured private investments.

47

Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2007
Review from the floor
Keshav Acharya
Chief Economic Advisor
Nepal Rastra Bank
(currently working at the IMF)
Nepal’s economy holds tremendous potential in the long run, among
others, in bio-diversity, hydro-electricity and tourism.
For any meaningful, comprehensive and sustainable transformation of the
Nepali economy, one should begin from agriculture where nearly 21 of the
28 million Nepali people depend for their livelihood. In the last 10 years,
Nepal’s traditional farm production such as rice, wheat, pulses and
oilseeds have been almost displaced by Indian production for the
following reasons:
a. India is in the process of completing its second generation of green
revolution, whereas Nepali farming practices remain traditional even
today. This has created a huge productivity differential between the
Nepali and Indian food production. As such, given the open border, it
is quite natural for the Indian food grains to substitute Nepali produce.
b. In the process of liberalization, Nepal has withdrawn all forms of
subsidies from agriculture, whereas India continues to heavily
subsidize the use of chemical fertilizer, seeds, electricity, diesel, farm
credit, extension services, and railway and sea freight for farm
produce. Furthermore, India is accelerating public investments on
infrastructure such as irrigation, rural roads, rural electrification, and
extension of railway connection to rural India. In Nepal public capital
allocation for agriculture is subsequently declining. Naturally,
competitiveness of Nepal’s agriculture is successively eroding.
c. Yet, there are lots of prospect for Nepali agriculture. The prospect lies
in the rich bio-diversity of Nepal. The inflow of Indian FDI in the form
of Dabur, Hindustan Lever and a few others is a clear indication of this
competitive advantage of Nepal vis-a-vis India. What the state needs to
do is to inject sufficient investment on infrastructure such as irrigation,
electricity and road or cable car connectivity, by mobilizing donor
support; and enforce the property rights.
d. In the last several years, there has been a massive build-up of
infrastructure in Tibet and a tremendous increase in Tibetan
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purchasing power. If Nepal endeavors to supply the food demand of
Tibetan consumers, it can transform the livelihood of Nepal’s northern
hills and mountains; it requires the provision of infrastructure and
technical know-how.
The talk has been going on in the last couple of years to develop Nepal as
a transit corridor between India and China. The geographers and engineers
have advocated that there are several prospective road projects which can
considerably narrow the distance between these two fast growing
countries. Given the rapidly growing trade flows between the two giant
economies, the Nepali authorities can approach these neighboring
countries to invest on mutually beneficial road projects through Nepal.
Such road connectivity would also help to explore the possibility of
developing pasture in Nepal’s northern highlands, which in turn would
support sheep farming which would substitute the import of raw wool, for
making carpets and pashmina.
Nepal Government’s Department of Mines and Geology needs to
undertake a massive survey to find out which gems are available in
commercial quantity. After this, the Government will have formulated
laws, rules, and regulations governing extraction, processing, and export
of gems and jewelry by the private sector with international joint ventures.
Provision of infrastructure and public utilities is too costly in hills and
mountains, as compared to terai and the valleys. There should be
inducement and incentive given to people to resettle or conglomerate in
areas that are wide enough and free from geological and other natural
hazards such as land slide, from the perspective of cheaper cost of
providing modern basic amenities of life. Furthermore, such resettlement
would create space for private sector in terms of construction and repair.
Regarding development of private sector in Nepal, the Nepali authorities
have mostly played on tariff differential or arbitrage with India. Goods
imported to Nepal were illegally smuggled into India against the payment
in Indian Currency. Such a trade policy generated customs revenue and
brought Indian currency into Nepal and offset the trade gap with India.
Things have changed now. India is fast lowering its tariff structure to
allow no space for arbitrage in Nepal. Now is the time for Nepal’s private
sector to look into the country’s long-term comparative advantage. In this
context, the following things need to be done to facilitate the development
of private sector in Nepal.
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a. Provide macroeconomic stability, particularly in its fiscal and
monetary policy. Have political consensus on not making frequent
changes in the rate of tax. It is right time for the economic policy
agenda to get space in the debate on constitution. As there is a general
drift towards federal structure of government, the constitution should
clearly spell out the basis of resource sharing between the federal and
the provincial governments.
b. The constitution should layout the blueprint categorically for the space
of state and the area for public private partnerships, so that the private
sector can plan its activities accordingly.
c.

Private enterprises of certain size and above should be made to follow
nationally defined accounting standards and disclosure norms for
increased transparency of financial statements, and there should be
some mechanism to constantly monitor to increase public investment
in stocks.

d. The private financial sector is urban centric. In the rural area there is a
very thin and sparse presence of financial services, especially in the
hills and mountains. Some intervention seems imperative in expanding
financial services to rural areas in general and in the hills and the
mountains in particular. The preferred nature of intervention would be
budgetary and tax incentives, rather than the government itself
operating financial services.
e. Since the last few years, annual remittance inflows have exceeded the
combined total receipt from exports, tourism, and foreign aid. But, the
contribution of remittances is confined to sustaining consumption,
imports and somewhat real estate investment. There should be a plan
to pool some resources from remittances for undertaking productive
investment in areas such as hydro or microfinance with full legal
guarantee of returns to the remitters.
f. There has been a tremendous proliferation of bank and non-bank
financial institutions in the urban areas, which puts a limit on the
supervisory capacity of the central bank. There is an urgent need to set
up a second tier supervisory institution and also a need for some kind
of self-regulation of these institutions.
g. Nepal should reorient its focus on the development of self-regulated
cooperative societies and microfinance institutions in the rural areas,
with some kind of initial budgetary support.
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h. To reduce the cost of operation of financial services in rural and
deprived areas, rather than opening a new branch or a full-fledged
institution in such areas, one can look for a local agent, train him and
assign him with the task of lending and recovering for a certain fee.
i.

Finally, one can also look into the prospect of formalizing, organizing
and consolidating the informal financial services that have been in
existence in Nepal since time immemorial into modern type of
microfinance institutions, without much financial and bureaucratic
cost.
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A Summary of the E-Seminar Floor Discussion
The paper presentation and designated discussants’ comment was
followed by a virtual floor discussion among the participants. The
discussion has been rearranged thematically and follows an ascending date
order (i.e, older postings first, followed by new postings). The major
themes are listed below. A list of participants can be found in the annex:
1.

PSD in a political context

2.

Big pillar: Hydropower

3.

Small pillar: MSMEs and the business environment

4.

PSD, human development and social issues

1. PSD IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT
Maoists have not clarified their vision and economic agendas, but some
of their initial priorities and positioning have begun to emerge.
Nepal has indisputably experienced a shift towards left in the political
balance of power, with the emergence of the Maoists as a big political
force. In the changed political context, the designated discussants have
raised concerns that the mainstream political parties, especially the
Maoists, have not clarified their vision and economic agendas for the New
Nepal. Will the economic liberalization that began in 1992 continue?
What would be the parties’ approach to private sector development?
What direction should the private sector development (PSD) take in
Nepal, especially on the general pitfalls that Nepal should avoid in the
areas of protection of private property rights, treatment of FDI vis-à-vis
domestic sources of investment, the issue of social and gender inclusion in
private enterprises, level of protection of domestic industries, and
promotion of competitive business environment?
(Vijaya Sharma)
The Maoists have outlined their economic agenda and the corruption
control has become one of their priority fields, to be followed by the
radical land reform, and the regulation of the FDIs. Like everyone else,
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they also see hydro and tourism as our comparative advantage. They also
profess a mixed economy, but with a protectionist flavor.
(Alok Bohara)
This article in Nepal Weekly by Rishikesh Dahal might be of interest to
the participants on Maoist vision on PSD for New Nepal:
http://www.kantipuronline.com/Nepal/artha.php
This article reports that the Maoists commit to: (i) a mixed economy with
individual rights to profit; (ii) transparency and corruption control; and
(iii) revolutionary land reform (including scaling/upgrading of cooperatives). Sectorally, they seem to have picked up hydropower and
tourism as potential growth-bearers and connectivity (e.g. an ambitious
east-west highway in the Mahabharata region) as a primary developmental
goal on PSD. This shows signs of welcome pragmatic improvisations on
Baburam Bhattarai’s ‘red’ vision twelve years ago. ‘Old wine, new bottle’
might be too much of an expression, but save some logistical differences
in modalities, a Maoist PSD agenda might not really be ‘the new broom’
either, which should actually leave policymakers a small space for policy
maneuvering in the coming days.
(Mallika Shakya)
Unfortunately, the Maoists have said different things to different
audiences and in different forums. Therefore, while we should hope for
the best for PSD and for overall economic growth development following
the experience of other countries, "policy uncertainty" should remain as an
overwhelming issue until we see convincing evidence of their policy.
(Jagadish Upadhyay)
I agree that there is policy uncertainty regarding the Maoists’ vision, but I
disagree that this should remain an overwhelming issue. Should this
ambiguity not allow the policymakers a good pretext to assert their vision
before they are pre-empted by either ultra-leftists or ultra-rightists? It is
absolutely right that a debate on Maoism-vs-Capitalism is a non-starter.
However, if we go a step below, it is not so black-and-white. It is largely
about technical coherence of institutions, regulations, and incentives. For
example, if we want to develop niche products, which have been our
competitive advantage throughout both Panchayat and Bahudal; the recipe
does not necessitate a philosophical debate on left-vs-right. It is about
ensuring that we develop effective certifying and market promotion
agencies; avail appropriate financial instruments for transactions to
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happen;
develop
provision
of
backbone
services;
allow
collaboration/innovation economics; develop a smooth supply chain.
(Mallika Shakya)
Federalism is a rapidly emerging issue and PSD strategies will have to
take stock of this discussion
The federalism issue is quite complicated in the current context and any
link to the PSD will be overshadowed by numerous other contentious
issues. It is the institution that makes a long-lasting difference in the
making of a nation and the people. That is, federalism is not the only real
issue; the problem should also address the degree of
centralization/decentralization including both the political and economic.
One of the issues that I have raised constantly is the issues of revenue
sharing 50/50 from the hydro resources. Giving some economic clout to
the regional governments is a good start. But, such revenue must not be
spent anything other than education, health, and the infrastructure.
A complete version of my article on federalism is linked to the following
website as a February 26, 2007 attachment:
http://nepalstudycenter.unm.edu/SeminarsWorkshopsConferences/eSeminars/e-SeminarN012007/ e-SeminarNo12007_PaperAccess.html
Also, it may be worth reading the following interview with Mr. Yash Pal
Ghai: http://kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=101887
(Alok Bohara)
2. ‘BIG’ PILLAR: HYDROELECTRICITY
(a)

WHO ARE THE INVESTORS?

First few projects have set a bad example.. …
Nepal has seen the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector
of electricity generation (the 60mw Khimti from Norwegian Statkraft and
the 36mw Bhotekoshi from Panda Energy of USA), and this has vitiated
the market in such a way that FDI in power sector has now become an
anathema. They have been instrumental in raising retail electricity rates to
the extent that a further rate increase would never be politically
acceptable. If, however, the retail rates are not raised, the Nepal Electricity
Authority (NEA) would go into financial bankruptcy.
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(Keshav Upadhyay)
Funds may be difficult to mobilize ….
So far as FDI in the power sector is concerned, everything that Ms.
Shakya warns against has happened here. It has distorted the price, and is
neither cost effective nor market friendly. NEA is very apprehensive of
entering into new power purchase agreements because of its bitter
experience in the past. Therefore, not enough investment from the private
sector is coming into this sector. NEA has been continuously in the red for
half a decade now and is, without a surplus, not in a position to invest. The
government, on the other hand, does not treat electricity as infrastructure
but rather as a commercial commodity, and recent utterances of the
finance minister confirm this. The only option that remains is the national
private sector, which is also hampered by archaic rules and regulations
unfriendly to investment.
The size of investible funds may be difficult to mobilize. My estimate
indicates a figure of nine billion rupees that must be invested annually to
meet the rising demand of 60mw per year. Is our banking system capable
of lending this amount of money where the return on investment starts
trickling in only after five years at the least? Meanwhile the country is
reeling under a severe power crisis leading to a blackout of six hours per
day for we don’t know how long.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
Talking about hydropower and bashing Independent Power Producer’s
Bhotekoshi and Khimti has become nation’s favorite pastime. All the
people who earned donor dollars to crib against the private developers in
the past ten years could not suggest alternatives; therefore, Nepal is back
reeling under power shortages. While we talk of private investment in
hydropower, we talk as if we have zillions of people lining up to invest in
Nepal. Contrary to that, it is difficult to find investors in the hydropower
sector. Only 15 hydropower projects have financially closed in the past
decade and a half out of which two are in Nepal. Price is determinant on
cost of production. Nepal is not credit rated and therefore getting financing
for Nepal is utterly difficult. When the financial closing for Bhotekoshi
was underway, 63 banks rejected the proposal despite being led by a
multilateral like IFC and had a dollar based PPA. The guarantee of
countries like Nepal which people presume to be part of selling national
sovereignty is a piece of paper and many guarantees globally have been
meaningless.
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(Sujeev Shakya)
SujeevJi is right that there are not many possible investors and we should
give every opportunity to those who really want to invest in hydro power
in Nepal, but there are about fifty applications pending in NEA for Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA). Developers are running from pillar to post for
PPA. Nothing happens. Recently I had an opportunity to go to NEA to
discuss with NEA people about the energy rates for a hydropower project
to be developed. Apparently there is a glut of investors.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
Good enabling environment is a prerequisite in invoking competition so
equilibrium can be reached. But there is nothing that says that
competitiveness deteriorates as soon as foreign aid is received. Other
countries seem to have maintained such competitive local environment
even when mobilizing donor-grants or subsidized-credit. This has been
successfully experimented in several East Asian and Latin American
countries. A good technical specialist can develop such modality in
Nepal’s context too. Nepal’s decision to go straight to commercial
investors is good but one only hopes that this was done only after
exhausting more pragmatic options.
(Mallika Shakya)
Donor money has failed us …
Perhaps, Nepali hydropower have not been able to take off as the people
who think they have solutions for this ‘business of hydropower’ are not
investors, but people who continuously make it an issue to study and
compile reports and do workshops. They can point out what is wrong but
not come with a concrete solution. As I mentioned in my earlier
deliberations also that such people for the past couple of decades belching
different formulae have landed Nepal into darkness.
The issue is of action and taking risk! Perhaps apart from the private
sector there are none to take this ‘risk’ as they look for the reward for the
institutions unlike the ‘rewards’ that public sector projects bring to
individuals who are bestowed strategic positions. If Nepali hydropower is
to be harnessed, the options are either to take grants and deliver expensive
projects to the economy and create more debt on the average Nepali, or to
allow private entrepreneurs to take risk and get it going with at least one
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project. Else even in 2017 we will still be having the same deliberations
now that are not different than what we were having in 1997!
(Sujeev Shakya)
I do not agree that donor aid and FDI are a trade-off. The European
infrastructure model of the 1950s and the East Asian infrastructure model
of the 1970s have one thing in common. They both mobilized donor credit
(i) to set up market-efficient models which dissected public goods from
private, and awarded commercially-managed contracts to competitive
private bidders; (ii) to invest heavily on technology/knowledge-transfer as
the projects proceeded; and (iii) to subsequently graduate from the donor
credit by replicating the models internally for future ventures. Besides,
more of Nepal’s donor debt seems to come not from mega-infrastructure
projects but from something less ambitious. And the rest comes from
paying for IPP-power that was never consumed.
I also do not agree that academics are a waste of time. Negotiation in big
projects will come from number-crunching, than from lobbying/lindedhipi or abstract philosophizing. I am always impressed to see the
academics in UK and US, for example, coming to aid of the governments
in bargaining with the private sector. Nepal might be only beginning to
wake up to it, but it is better late than never.
(Mallika Shakya)
Partnership with India is an attractive option but increasingly sensitive
and inextricably webbed with foreign policy issues …
In Nepal’s case, hydropower sector is not a normal industry. It has deep
security implications. In fact, this sector has been the bone of contention
between India and Nepal for a long time. Many in Nepal feel it is the only
tangible and realistic potential we have for our economic development.
Nepal does not want to give that up so easily, but use it towards leverage
whenever we wish to bargain with India. This psychology has cost us
money and time, as the water continues to flow without being tapped for
power.
I remember what Chandra Sekhar told a group of prominent Nepalis in the
1990s when he was the Indian Prime Minister. His statement was
something like "I heard about your hydro potential and India’s power need
when I was a teenager, I heard the same thing when I was a MP, and I am
hearing the same story now I am the PM. You will not develop it yourself,
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and you will not allow us to develop it for you. You will remain poor, and
you will also cause us to remain poor". This was frustration from a very
powerful man, who could not break the barrier of mistrust Nepalis have
for any Indian initiated development of our most coveted resource.
We need to let go of the mistrust with India and play with them on
pragmatic level. While we must maintain control of the national priorities,
we must work with Indian and other foreign investors on mutually
beneficial grounds. We cannot sit on the hydro-potential for ever. Nepal
should also be very clear on what it wants. There will be cost of
development. There will be loss of some control when you do a big trade.
There will also be social perversions and environmental degradations that
will accompany hydro development. We must assess them carefully and
accept some costs.
(Ambika P. Adhikari)
I agree that we have to have some sort of understanding with Indians for
the development of hydropower in a big scale. But are they interested? I
am asking this question because despite Parliament’s ratification of
Mahakali treaty nothing has happened. There is a school of thought in
Nepal which says that Indians are interested in river treaties, more for
water than power. They can have power from other sources, but their
problem in the foreseeable future is the availability of drinking water.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
As a political economist I see the need to develop Nepal’s water resources
speedily. There is no point sitting over it and let India develop all the
water resources and have the claim of the first use. But that should not
mean pawning all our water resources for perpetuity. We will learn by
doing. We had a very bad experience with Koshi, Gandak and now
Mahakali. Why is Mahakali Nepali side of the bandh [dam] so high that
water flows to Nepal only during rainy season? Why did we renew the
Sharada agreement without amendment when it expired? Why do we
always get hoodwinked? Are we able now to negotiate with more
technical knowledge?
Will bringing in the Indian private sector make the Indian investment to
Nepal’s need more responsive? Our experience with the Indian State has
not been happy. How far the Indian State is willing to change? Once these
issues are sorted out, technical questions, environmental issue etc. can be
solved easily. But given Nepal’s terrain, investment capacity, and
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difficulty in network expansion due to terrain, perhaps smaller projects
should be supported actively for rural consumption in the Hills, while a
few larger projects taken up both for export and Nepal’s industrialization
and transport development.
(Meena Acharya)
Most of us turn blind eye to the fact that interest of India on Nepal is not
on getting electric power but on securing water supplies be in the name of
high dams or the lower riparian state. One should read the mind of South
Block not whether the Indian States facing shortage of power supplies.
(Dileep Adhikary)
Forget India. If they want Nepali hydropower they will come on their own.
And the subject has now become so sensitive that no politician wants to be
seen selling hydropower to India because then he would be charged of
selling the sovereignty.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
Regional FDI might replace FDI from far …
Hydropower development in Nepal has long been held as a panacea for
Nepal’s economic development. The government and foreign-aided
hydropower development have not been that successful, both due to large
per unit cost (construction inefficiencies, graft), and problems of
maintenance. Since 1992, the private sector development of the
hydropower was seen as the best approach to utilize Nepal’s most
important economic potential while utilizing the private sector efficiency.
There lingers a vast controversy on the modalities of these investments.
Although the previous few private power development projects were
carried out by the US, Australian, Chinese, and a few other companies, the
most successful ventures have been the ones organized by the Nepali
investors.
The most recent private hydropower development projects are almost all
proposed by Indian or Indian-Nepali joint investors. This is an interesting
change and merits a careful review. The Indian companies are perhaps,
best suited to operate in Nepal due to their proximity, cultural and
economic understanding of the Nepali situation, and relatively low cost of
their professional and other costs. More importantly they are in the best
position to negotiate Indian market for Nepal generated power. However,
Many Nepalis are long concerned about the possible compromise of
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national security, and monopsony by the Indian state in the development
of Nepal’s hydropower. Also, Nepal wishes to diversify its investor’s list,
and wishes to attract non-Indian investors in the power sector to obtain
foreign technology and also to counter the enormous Indian influence in
Nepal.
(Ambika P. Adhikari)
I found the differentiation between the Indian State and Indian privatesector FDI very revealing indeed. Same differentiation can be made
between the Nepali State and Nepali private investors/NRNs. I believe
paying attention to such subtleties might open new doors in future.
(Mallika Shakya)
(b)

WHAT IS THE MARKET?

Nepal’s own internal demand is skyrocketing

…

My estimate indicates a figure of nine billion rupees that must be invested
annually to meet the rising demand of 60mw per year.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
The discussions on February 18 and 19 mainly focused on power sector in
Nepal, especially Nepal’s bitter experiences with FDI in Khimti and
Bhotekoshi projects (and) the severe crunch of power shortage in the
country.
(Vijaya Sharma)
The private sector power development did face hurdles. The BhoteKoshi
power purchase agreement generated much controversy inviting
intervention from the US government and law suits from the private
developer.
On the other hand, some local Nepali invested smaller projects have
become successful and profitable. They catered to the available demand,
utilized local man-power and professional expertise, and were much better
grounded in the local reality.
The many black -outs, load- shedding and lack of power for industries are
proving that there is enough domestic demand for power in Nepal.
Further, with the rise of income that is anticipated in the post-conflict

60

Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2007
Nepal, the emerging Nepali economy should be able to absorb power from
several small and medium size projects.
(Ambika P. Adhikari)
A discussion whether India is interested or not on Nepali hydropower
should be concluded only after we have tried the Indian private sector.
Nepal is probably not capable enough (yet) to tackle the Indian
businessmen, but there are many brokers in the international market that
can do this job for fees. All this only emphasizes the need for a better
business enabling environment and investment climate, which is the
State’s responsibility. I very much agree with AmbikaJi about increasing
local demand for power. This may even make Component C redundant.
To encourage local absorption of hydropower, it is imperative that the
hydro strategy doesn’t stand in isolation but is closely linked with SME
development strategy. The ongoing safa tempo [clean autos] strike in
Kathmandu to protest the power cut reminds us of the direct connection
here.
(Mallika Shakya)
India remains a large market and we should tap alternative avenues if
the government channels are not working
In my opinion, a major problem faced by the middle and large sized
foreign developed projects is the difficulties in accessing the Indian
market. Although some experts have talked about it, no one has seriously
explored the national consumption potential, and increasing the domestic
demands for power in the interim.
(Ambika P. Adhikari)
I do not know what the answer is for our own internal housekeeping, for
example, for or against FDI and/or expediting the regulatory process. But,
the rising economic super power –India—is not certainly waiting around
for Nepal to be the source of its energy needs. Any unnecessary regulatory
mechanism to slowdown FDI in the hydro sector will hurt us from
becoming a player in the emerging regional energy market. I am sure that
the Indian economy’s double digit growth and its rising energy
consumption need have not gone unnoticed among the policy makers in
Nepal. Pakistan is another potential market, and between the two of them,
the South Asian region could be a vibrant market for energy exports and
imports.
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India has already begun to look into its insatiable energy need from a
larger regional perspective, and Nepal may or may not factor into this
equation. The choice is ours to make. From this perspective, the state’s
role is vital in developing the necessary groundwork to make us
competitive in this vast energy market. To that end, making government
actively involved in the FDI regulation may prove to be counter
productive. India has increased its involvement in Bhutan’s hydro sector,
and is looking to import gas and electricity from Bangladesh and
Myanmar. India is also looking to invest in a coal plant in Sri Lanka.
(Alok Bohara)
I am still not convinced why do we fully exclude the possibility that the
Indian private sector might be interested after all? If there is a market
demand, what stops them from exploring new economic opportunities in
Nepal especially when they have a competitive advantage over others on
knowledge and information? For example, Bangladesh has been totally
unsuccessful in selling its gas to India, but Tata is very much making its
entrance there. Are we exploring that possibility at all?
These same issues might be very much relevant for various other
industrial sectors, e.g., roads, telecom, IT, tourism, etc.
(Mallika Shakya)
South Asian and Central Asian market potentials are also there …
On the western front, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyz
Republic are assessing the prospect of exporting about 1000 MW of
hydropower from Central Asia to South Asia with the possibility of
importing gas from Iran and Turkmenistan. With a population of 1.5
billion people, this region (including SAARC) could be one of the largest
markets for energy consumption. Thus, the regional trade in energy is not
a distant hypothetical fantasy anymore. Within a decade or so, we may be
seeing regional grid sharing and power trading all across the subcontinent.
Can Nepal afford not to join this regional energy market? What export
policy does Nepal need to facilitate such an option? What can we learn
from Bhutan? Should we be focusing on Indian private ventures for our
hydro developments? What could be an efficient energy trading model?
(Alok Bohara)
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(c)

WHAT ARE THE KEY TRANSACTIONAL ISSUES?

PPA and environmental assessment remain thorny issues …
Private power producers need to pay for insurance, legal costs and interest
during construction. We always compare these costs with NEA developed
projects like Kali Gandaki and now Middle Marsyangdi where there are
neither elements of interest factored nor any financial considerations on
account of delay factored in. If we take both into consideration many
studies have shown that Kali Gandaki is perhaps more expensive to the
economy than the IPPs. The fact that Chilime, the NEA promoted
company has a rate that is close to the IPP rates perhaps reflects on the
fact that if we have to assume that there is cost to money and money is not
free and there is a concept called time value of money and delays do not
amount to cost, then the rates paid to IPP are close to the real prices. If we
continue to harp expensive power by comparing oranges with apples then
we will land up writing many seminar papers, but Nepal will continue to
reel in the dark. It is like complaining about foreign airlines that charge
dollar fares that ferry Nepalis outside Nepal taking business away from
our national flag carrier!
If NEA has bled on account of exchange losses by paying dollars rates to
Bhotekoshi and Khimti, it would be interesting to see the balance sheet
improve this year when the dollar rates have actually come down making
the prices of Chilime and Bhotekoshi the same.
(Sujeev Shakya)
Could Merchant Power Stations without a legally binding power purchase
agreement be built in Nepal? Would anybody invest in it? There was a
small mention (in the meeting) about energy price of Chime. It is at par
with Khimti and Bhotekoshi, even a little higher, though I am not quite
sure about it. But Chilime people would hotly deny it. They would say that
since NEA owns 51% of the equity in Chilime, NEA does get a very good
dividend, and so if you take that into account the effective rate, it would be
much lower than Khimti or Bhotekoshi’s.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
Also to respond to SujeevJi’s assertion about shortening environmental
assessment procedure, I beg to disagree. Nepal’s geology is very fragile,
its bio-diversity highly vulnerable, and the rural population powerless to
block large developments. In fact, in the equation of power development,
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the local communities lose the most as the power is transmitted to urban
areas and possibly to India, leaving the local communities to bear the
brunt of the environmental damages, while most of the time not even
getting any power. Even when power may be available, they cannot afford
the price.
During the late nineties, I was involved in the socio-environmental impact
management of the Bhotekoshi power project during its developmental
phase. I remember how the locals lost precious amenities, how their
houses were creaked due to blasts during construction, and how they were
displaced from the places of their adobe. The only gains were that some
villagers got the menial jobs temporarily. I strongly believe that
socioeconomic and bio-physical impacts of the large hydropower projects
should be rigorously prepared, actively mitigated, and regularly
monitored. State’s regulatory roles are critical in this phase.
(Ambika P. Adhikari)
Calculating time, opportunity costs …
In the power sector we need more radical reforms to look at the scrapping
the system of PPAs and survey licenses and at shortening the
Environmental Impact Assessment timeline. There is a demand for power
in Nepal and India and there are projects that can be developed; so, leave
the rest to the market. People are sitting on survey licenses (bestowed
upon by political masters) for years. Like sitting on plots of land and not
building houses they are trying to cash on the premium. Scrap the licenses,
(and) let (those) merchants (build) power plants who can manage risks
(that) come up with power; they will find the market themselves.
(Sujeev Shakya)
I understand very well that alternative investment opportunities are high in
advanced economies which skyrocket their alternative costs as well as
make LDC State guarantees less attractive. One solution might be to
accept this at the face value and go with the high costs factored in. But
LDCs in the increasingly globalized world do have a better option, which
is to seek local and regional funds. Often, these local/regional funds are
the victims of the same evil. SujeevJi rightly pointed out that Nepalis sit in
a plot of land for years without building on it. Does this not, at least in
principle, give a local visionary entrepreneur an opportunity to develop a
local/regional hydro fund?
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I am not too sure that Nepal’s current hydro loss is coming from the
subsidization-vs-capitalization dilemma. I think a larger factor might be
the problem that the one component was never sufficiently dissected and
differentiated from the other. We cannot ignore the importance of minicalculations and comparative bargains from within the country and within
the region.
(Mallika Shakya)
Risk management related issues
As far as commercial banks are concerned, hydropower financing
represents a small portion of their total risk assets and they are still testing
the waters. Mostly the involvement in a project is below 50 per cent of
their Single Obligor Limit (SOL). To raise money for 5 MW projects,
more than five commercial banks will be involved. The following factors
are responsible for the slow take off of hydropower financing.
1. long tenure of loans
2. longer construction period requiring interest capitalization
3. lack of understanding on the part of the lenders on technical
aspects of projects
4. absence of credible agency for verification of various costs (civil
as well as electromechanical) and suitability of the equipment
associated with the project
5. absence of proper dissemination of information on credit
enhancement such as insurance
6. political situation of the country. Contradictory messages from the
responsible persons in political parties.
7. over eagerness of promoters in reducing the cost of the project
resulting in wrong choice of contractors/equipment suppliers.
8. financial health of the only buyer of the product, NEA
9. non-clarity on the price escalation factor on PPA (for 100kw to
2000kw projects) after 2060/61, for power projects which have
already signed PPAs with NEA (6 percent per annum till then)
10. case to case decision by NEA on the imposition of penalty if the
commercial operation is not started as per the PPA
11. lack of close cooperation between the lenders and the borrowers
resulting in various amendments in the agreements signed by
borrowers (with civil contractors/electromechanical component
suppliers etc)
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12. lack
of
clear
distinction
contractors/suppliers.

between

promoters

and

Some of the issues can be taken care of by professional bodies
(Association of IPPs and others) or bilaterally between borrowers and
lenders. However, some of the constraints mentioned above need the
involvement of agencies/individuals in a structured way. Independent
institutions need to bridge the gap between the prospective lenders and
borrowers. Financing in hydropower is still at a nascent stage and
confidence-building measures by these institutions will pave the way for
greater involvement of the commercial banks in this sector.
In hydropower project financing, banks will prefer:
•
debt: equity ratio between 60:40 to 80:20
•
timely infusion of equity by the promoters
•
construction period of not over two years
•
grade period of 3-6 months
•
total loan period between 7-9 years (including construction and
grade period)
•
detailed background checks on the suppliers, especially from
emerging markets, and contractors
•
financial guarantees from sponsors to take care of cost escalations,
if any, if the project contracts are not close ended
•
updated and on demand information on the project
•
clear separation of interests of the sponsors and
contractors/suppliers (no conflict of interest)
•
(Nirmal Dahal, Manager, Credit Risk, Laxmi Bank Ltd)
(Published in New Business Age, January 2007)
Variation is a trap when trust is none
‘Variation’ is one world media has discussed most recurrently in the
context of large construction projects, which has to do with the deviation
in production volume, cost and schedule that significantly affect projects.
Although variation could mean both rise and fall in costs, in Nepal’s
context, variation has been synonymous with rise in costs and project
delay. Kaligandaki and Mid-Marsyangdi are two recent examples.
Deviations are bound to occur throughout the hydropower project cycles
because the geological details start to manifest only after the tunnel is dug.
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Let’s take the example of Chilime, which started out with estimations that
the tunnel will penetrate 1930m of good rock, 1930m of regular rock and
566m of difficult rock. It turned out it was faced with over 2700m of very
difficult rock, increasing the consumption of iron 300% more than
originally estimated.
The legal contract often spells out provisions for variations and larger
projects follow the guidelines provided by the International Federation of
Consulting Engineers (FIDIC). FIDIC engineers have a profound role in
amendment of designs and estimation of costs arising from variations.
Engineers’ lack of credibility, experience, and efficiency will lead to
claims and counterclaims jeopardizing the life of the project itself.
The FIDIC engineers in multinational investments are selected through
international competition, e.g., MKI-USA in Kaligandaki. KG’s average
production cost was estimated to be USD 2530/kw and fuel production
cost US cents 4.52/unit. But bilateral donor projects require that FIDIC
engineers are selected from within donor nationality contestants: the
German Fisher JV in Mid-Marsyangdi project is one example. MM’s
average production cost was USD 5450/kw and fuel production cost US
cents 12.7/unit. Chilime designated the project head to function as the civil
and hydro-mechanical engineer. Chilime’s average production cost was
USD 1583/kw and fuel production costs US cents 2.6/unit. Puwakhola in
Ilam designated the Engineering Directorate within NEA for this purpose.
Its average production cost was USD 2865/kw and fuel production cost
US cents 4.63/unit. Modi designated a team of donor/local consultant
agencies and NEA engineers. Modi’s average production cost was USD
2074/kw and fuel production cost US cents 4.25/unit.
Variation is a normal process in construction projects. It is important that
donor-granted projects also select FIDIC engineers through international
competition process to avoid negative effects of variation. Since research
and analysis are crucial for any discussion on variation-related issues, it is
important that the State makes provisions to involve engineering students
in study and analysis of these issues. NEA itself can form a division to
properly investigate, research and evaluate the impacts of variation in the
major hydro projects and institutionalize/disseminate the lessons learnt. It
is both a challenge and opportunity for engineers to demonstrate that
projects can be accomplished with minimum disturbances in costs and
schedules despite serious variation issues.
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(Lilanath Bhattarai, Manager, NEA & Chief, Chilime Hydropower)
(Published in Himal Feb-Mar 2007)
(Unofficial translation: Mallika Shakya)
(d)

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE MODALITIES AND WHAT IS
THE ROLE OF THE STATE?

Should hydropower be a commercial commodity or essential
infrastructure?
The problem with hydropower is how you treat power in the economic
schema. Do you take it as an essential part of infrastructure, or is it a
commodity like say a pair of shoes? There are two sides, both equally
important. First one is of course the need for investment, where does the
money come from? If you give a handsome return to the investors,
investment will surely come. But then the price of energy will go soaring
high. Can you allow that? What would be the impact in the
macroeconomic sphere if you let that happen? It is here that I think there is
a need of serious intervention by the government. If you are clear about it,
color of the cat is not important.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
Is power not a single unit but multiple and eclectic? Its commercial
components might include core components of power generation, but its
infrastructure components surely include the public goods of roads and
transmission lines. But in today’s financial sophistication, it should well
be possible to differentiate the treatment of these two components so that
we avoid the dilemma of subsidization versus capitalization.
To take one example, from Bangladesh, the power finance facility, first,
set up a public fund (through govt., multilateral and bilateral donors).
They then dissected this into two sub-components, each managed by
different entities. The government managed the first subcomponent: First,
it developed an eclectic (as opposed to ‘thick’) infrastructure plan based
on social-cost-benefit-analysis (as opposed to financial CBA). Second, the
plan mobilized the donor support to award contracts to private bidders on
a competitive basis. Since the fund was based on the local currency,
bidders were either local companies or were sufficiently locally grounded.
The second subcomponent was a purely commercial credit which was
managed by a commercial financial institution for commercial
remunerations on commercial principles.
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(Mallika Shakya)
Unbundling power generation from distribution so risks become more
manageable and more bidders can participate …
The transmission lines have to get to a special purpose vehicle owned by
the state and let everybody use it like they can use the road by paying tolls.
Let distribution be managed by municipalities who know the customer
better and cut debtors. Let private sector be just allowed to build
generation plants. If we take the potential of 40,000 MW to sell at 5 cents
a unit based on current estimates, it can fetch $ 150 billion plus revenues.
We need to re-engineer our thinking.
(Sujeev Shakya)
AmbikaJi suggested that local/regional investors better adapt to demands
at lower prices but cannot influence the Indian giant, while larger FDI are
worse in former and better in latter. But need this impose a policy trade off
for Nepal? Can we not have the good of both the worlds? Let’s develop a
hypothetical model where a hydropower project is divided into three clear
components: A. infrastructure and connectivity; B. core power generation;
C. international/regional mediation for market. Components A and C are
clearly public goods while B is private.
An efficient and competitive PPP (this could be a restructured NEA or a
different institution) can manage component A (with some donor funding).
Component B should be private -- the choice between local, regional and
international investment -- will be decided by pure competition (bidding
prices + environmental/social CBA). Component C can be headed by the
PPP but subcontracted to a top-notch private business strategy MNC that
can bring business leaders from India on board. Whether or not local
capital is better than FDI should be left to the market on purely
commercial products. The State should have a role on public goods. This
will not only increase the number of private bidders but also will bring
down the total costs substantially.
(Mallika Shakya)
My argument for unbundling of NEA is to segregate transmission (which
would be held by the public institution) from core power generation
(carried out by independent power producers from private sectors, be it
local or foreign) and distribution (again independent location specific that
would be catering to user committees or power consumption complexes).
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The transmission company charges a rate which either would have to be
absorbed by the producer or distributor, depending upon the negotiation
between the producer and distributor.
When we talk about big (MW wise) and cheap (power cost wise) projects
we have the habit of crossing the border to dispose off the energy thus
produced, forgetting the fact that Nepal itself can absorb 10000 MW of
power immediately if it is linked to preservation of the forests and thereby
ecology as well as curtailment of gasoline using vehicles that pollute the
cities and the highways. There are decent ways of promoting its
applicability at the real life situation. Experts with ideas are there in
Department of Wild Life and Nature Conservation, and National Trust for
Nature Conservation
Time has also come to think of technology to disintegrate water into
oxygen and hydrogen for use of the former as a life saver and the latter as
energy alternative.
(Dileep Adhikary)
I generally concur with DileepJi’s argument. Unbundling of generation
and distribution seems to be standard panacea, first used in England, and
then copied by California in mid 90s. (Of course, California energy crisis
was precipitated by it, but it had more to do with financial market failure
rather than unbundling itself. Plus, now we can learn lesson from their
mistakes to avoid such crisis.)
Two points: (1) Distribution sector should still be retained by public
sector because of inherent increasing return to scale in that sector. It is
standard prescription in this field. (2) As for generation, slowly, I think
the property rights for electricity generation sites should be transferred to
local government. I am beginning to believe that political situation will
evolve so that these districts will soon hire their own police force and
judiciary. The tragedy of Arun, Melamchi etc shows that local population
could be instigated by any two-bit NGO in KTM to oppose these projects.
Giving property rights to these small administrative districts will solve
these local non co-operation issues, and increase efficiencies.
(Biswo Poudel)
Other modalities and issues …
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Before IPP came into the picture, all the dealings of banks in this sector
were with the state-owned NEA and only a few banks were given access
to it. Now the scenario has changed. Most major banks are involved in
financing the hydro sector in one way or the other. Some have financed
the privatization of the state’s share in hydropower companies, some have
financed the purchase of the shares of foreign investors in IPPs by
domestic companies and some have provided direct financing to IPPs. In
the first two types of transactions, the source of debt repayment was the
cash flow of companies already in operation. In the last type of finance
where banks have directly financed the IPPs, the element of risk is quite
high as they will be involved from the initial stage of project construction.
Financiers and Project Financing…
Financing of hydropower involves long-term commitments from
commercial banks. However, traditionally banks have preferred financing
with short term commitments. Furthermore, infrastructure projects like
hydropower require longer construction periods. Due to the nature of the
finished product, there has to be a confirmed buyer for the electricity
produced (unlike the other traditional financing of merchandising nature in
which products don’t require particular long term contracts for the sale of
goods produced).
The development of a hydropower project requires the involvement of
various parties, developers, consultants, suppliers, contractors, operators,
buyers, regulators, local bodies, etc. The duties and responsibilities of the
parties involved are established through contracts. In this type of
financing, the contract is the king. A lender has to go through all these
contracts in order to understand the project.
As in other types of financing, the major risk for a bank is the credit risk
(default risk) – the borrower may not service and repay the loan as per the
commitment. Mere reliance on a contract will not be sufficient in
addressing this risk. Hence banks request for various credit enhancements
to mitigate it. Some common credit enhancement devices considered by
commercial banks are:
•
direct guarantees (sponsors, third party or other participants)
•
indirect guarantees (take or pay/take and pay)
•
letter of credit
•
surety obligations (bid bond, performance bond, payment bonds)
•
insurance (including advance loss of profit/loss of profit)
71

Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2007
•

unrelated fixed assets collateral

Due to the nascent stage of the financial sector in Nepal, it will take some
time for banks to lend on pure project financing terms where the lending is
secured purely by the underlying cash flow of projects and contracts. So
the development will be a gradual process. First the market will have to
be matured to a partial project financing mode where credit enhancement
will be limited (requirement of personal guarantee of the promoters only
till the time the project comes into operation and requirement for unrelated
fixed assets).
(Nirmal Dahal, Manager, Credit Risks, Laxmi Bank Ltd.,)
(Published in New Business Age, January 2007)
(e)

INVESTMENT CLIMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS,
POLITICIZATION AND RENT-SEEKING

De-license hydro

…

In the power sector we need more radical reforms to look at the scrapping
the system of PPAs and survey licenses and at shortening the
Environmental Impact Assessment timeline. There is a demand for power
in Nepal and India and there are projects that can be developed; so, leave
the rest to the market. People are sitting on survey licenses (bestowed
upon by political masters) for years. Like sitting on plots of land and not
building houses they are trying to cash on the premium. Scrap the licenses,
(and) let (those) merchants (build) power plants who can manage risks
(that) come up with power; they will find the market themselves.
If we have no problem in allowing fish which is a by-product of water to
be traded freely, why do we have problems in ensuring private trading of
electricity which is a by-product of water?
(Sujeev Shakya)

NEA or no NEA?
First thing that has to be done by the Government is
to establish a regulator who can balance the interests of both sides:
investor and consumer. It is very good for the government too, because it
takes on the responsibility of often unpopular pricing decisions which
have to be taken for the sake of the sector as a whole.
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Do a massive restructuring of NEA. Take away distribution from it,
initially. Give it to private companies or local bodies. We started
privatization in electricity from the wrong end. The reason obviously is
that MNCs are not interested in distribution, it is a messy business.
Generation is rather clean.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
Most of us give blind eye to the fact that interest of India on Nepal is not
on getting electric power but on securing water supplies be in the name of
high dams or the lower riparian state. One should read the mind of South
Block not whether the Indian States facing shortage of power supplies.
With this clarity engage multi-lateral agencies like ADB to be the gobetween even for the promotion of Private HE with India as a market.
Government as investor in NEA has serious limitations to provide funds
for NEA to make investments and presently NEA has serious limitations
of its own income to generate surplus for investments.
The current banking regulation in Nepal is to not help promote even
medium size (60-100mw) projects. … The current practices for
micro/small projects are based on milking NEA, not on the basis of
competitiveness. … But in developing hydroelectricity to the
desired/competitive level, unbundling of NEA is a critical requirement.
(Dileep Adhikary)
We agree that hydro-investment has to come from the private sector and
the public sector should facilitate it. Here do we have a good model for
public-private-partnership that would satisfy the demands of investment,
financial efficiency and knowledge transfer? The need to rid NEA of
political appointments and outdated knowledge is well established. Can
this be achieved in practice? And is the problem all political? What
technical capacity is NEA lacking which makes its performance so
dismal? Maybe it is NEA that has to be privatized, especially in
facilitating smaller projects more efficiently, as DileepJi has pointed out.
The role of ADB and other multilaterals in promoting Nepali hydropower
in the Indian market: Has ADB done this for any other countries? Some of
the examples from East Asia, if this is the basis for our hope on ADB,
might actually be less relevant for South Asia simply on the grounds that
East Asia enjoys far better regionalism than South Asia and hence
persuading powerful neighbors might be an easier task there. How about
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multinational business strategy companies who might specialize precisely
on hydro issues?
FDI is directly connected with technology transfer. If we missed the
technology lessons on how to build it locally next time -- they call it ‘the
Chinese lesson’ -- we wasted our opportunity in real terms. This is where
the State has a role, regardless of whether it is Red or Blue. This is where
NEA should have a role; and if it does not, then a new institution should
be developed to take this vital role.
(Mallika Shakya)
Politicians’ rent-seeking

…

Should not the political parties cease to make it an issue of party politics?
What do we do with the demands like that India should pay for the
Nepal’s share of water it uses, until Nepal can use its entire share? The
water is flowing any way. To me it seems Nepal needs to ensure only that
it can use its share when it wants.
(Meena Acharya)
Our ‘mindset’ …
This sector failed to grow. The main factor is the mind-set. We neither do
on our own nor allow the others to contribute in this sector. In regard to
external investor in this sector, we have a mind-set that we will be cheated
if at all we make a deal. Mahakali Project is its glaring example. Despite
the fact that the Project was framed on the basis of equal participation both
in investment and returns, we did not allow it to materialize so far. Even in
project such as Arun III, we did not go forward though it is most feasible
project. If at all we have shown interest in certain projects such as in
Marsyangdi and a few others, it is just because it served the vested
interests of certain groups.
Therefore, the main problem is educating ourselves. We have to come out
of the well and make meaningful dialogue maybe with our neighbors or
agencies outside the region for making best utilization of this scarce
resource. But for all this, the mind-set has to be changed and vision has to
be created that Nepal needs to be made an affluent country, rather than a
country moving with begging bowl. If we are clear about it, development
of hydropower to a desirable level does not seem to be a problem.
(Hari Bansh Jha)
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Educate the public

…

Educate the public that hydropower does not come cheap; massive
investments are required upfront to construct the power stations,
transmission lines, etc. The only attraction it has for us is that we do not
have to be dependent on import of other materials for our energy needs.
Stress the security angle that it provides, and say repeatedly that if we
tighten the belt now we will be free of the worries of Nakabandi, like the
one we had to face in 2046.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
3. ‘SMALL’ PILLAR: SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES
(MSME)
A good business enabling environment more important for the MSMEs
than for larger firms. The State has a crucial role in improvement not
only in regulatory procedures and development of backbone services, but
also in quality enhancement and overall equity of services and
opportunities …
What a state is supposed to do is to improve the business environment; it
will not be able to do it if it is politically weak on the one hand and
administratively confused on the other. My contention has been that it
should be policy making/implementation role for the ministry, regulatory
role for the government department, non-commercial services for the
public institution/enterprise and commercial activities for the private.
Presently, you will find ministry involved at the project level as well.
Activation, innovation and competition should be left to the private sector,
and the State should provide suitable legal and institutional frameworks to
create environment for the private sector activation, innovation and
competition. The state should cooperate from behind, not try to lead from
the front. The thrust required is on the front of infrastructure, and on the
arena of marketing and financial dynamics beyond the traditional buy and
sell and the traditional production credits. Missing are the services linked
to outreaching the market which would demand a specific highway
specific to product or services, and missing is the financing (that embodies
banking and financing beyond what is practiced or served currently in
Nepal).
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Integration is the key in the upcoming of the private sector which links it
from source to production (product or service) to market. Assuming that
macro policy (of openness and competition) is here to stay, and that
objectively we have to attain the economic growth of sustainable
magnitude through the expansion of the private sector activities, then what
needs to be pitched obviously is the appropriate legal and institutional
frameworks. Unless the government understands how a business happens
and that too at competitive terms the private sector will be too weak to
raise Nepal. That should be the starting point.
(Dileep Adhikary)
Dileep AdhikaryJi rightly emphasizes the improvement of legal and
institutional framework for PSD. Although there has been a large
successful sectoral growth of private sector institutions in education,
health, and finance in Nepal, it is important to remember that free markets
only cater to people who can vote with money. The result is a gross
disparity in access to quality services between Kathmandu and outside,
and between the well off and worse off even within Kathmandu. While the
growth of private activity in these sectors poses no direct problem, the
increasing inequality that results from it does.
(Mukti Upadhyay)
DileepJi has used the terms ‘business environment’ and ‘legal and
institutional frameworks,’ but some of the State’s roles require hands-on
actions rather than passive preservation of environment. Physical
infrastructure and backbone services alone require active engagement
from all sides.
I agree that the State must not try to lead but facilitate ‘activation,
innovation and competition’ from the private sector. Facilitation of this
innovation and competition will require establishment and nurturing of a
whole tier of institutions that actively promote and enable good practices
from the private sector. For example, brand-building or niche marketing is
an area where small countries like Switzerland and Nepal have
competitive advantage in products/services like carpets, tourism and
handicraft. Such sectors will require massive efforts on physical
infrastructure, backbone services and image-building. The Indian
government spent four million dollars to develop ‘India Everywhere’
brand to entice the foreign investors and convince them of its financial
credibility, which was then extended to ‘Incredible India’ brand for its
tourism market, and now a whole range of Indian products like IT,
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medical services, etc. capitalize on it. One might say national brand is a
big brand; private sector firms can go ahead and develop smaller product
brands for their individual products. But, the private sector will need to
have the right training/technological institutions to achieve the quality,
then certification agencies and harmonization procedures to gain
credibility, then promotion agencies to reach out to consumers, a sound
legal framework for incentive to innovate.
Bhola ChaliseJi pointed out in his comments, that of a bureaucratic duty
drawback for exporters which is too time-consuming to be useful. The
only sector which could convert this to a more user-friendly ‘bankguarantee-system’ was the garment industry. This shows that name of the
game is public-private-partnership or meaningful dialogue between the
two. Both of these require very specific knowledge, skills and experience,
and of course the right mindset. But this is very much the precursor to
PSD.
(Mallika Shakya)
And corruption remains a contentious issue …
While speaking of the private sector development and the state’s role, the
issue of transparency becomes a natural topic of focus. The newly passed
Competitive Bill (February 2007) seems very comprehensive in its scope
covering numerous angles such as, tied selling, bid rigging, cartel,
collective price fixing, market restrictions, dial-system, market
segregation, undue business influences, syndicate and exclusive dealing.
The government must be congratulated for the announcement. But, it
looks like a daunting task, and it will not be cheap. It will involve a sizable
workforce to detect violations. The legal cost of prosecution will also have
to be figured into the total enforcement cost. The stipulated fines of Rs
10K, Rs. 25K, Rs. 100K and even Rs. 300K don’t seem severe enough,
and are most likely to be internalized as a part of cost of doing business
and will be passed on to the consumers in the form of higher price.
Furthermore, these regulations are also likely to increase the rent seeking
behavior of the government employees and increase the opportunity for
corruption. The Competitive Bill needs to be equally matched by the other
corruption control measures and transparency measures. A city like
Bangalore, for example, reduced its low level rampant corruption by 30-40
% within a year or two by simply creating barriers between the “public”
and “the clerks”. For example, Instead of making the public stand in line
to get government services (e.g., paying bills, registration renewal), the
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government instituted the envelope drop-in system. This type of egovernance system diminishes the contacts between the public and “the
clerk-babus” and thus reduces the opportunity for bribery.
Advanced market economy like the US is also not immune to malpractices
in government contract deals. Consider the following data: Of the $380
billion government contract dollars in 2005, 20-30%, were rewarded
without any genuine competition. But, unlike in a country like Nepal,
there are civilian oversights of these activities, which include hearings at
the congressional level. In 2005 alone, the Public Corruption Program
convicted 759 cases out of 890 indictments. It is quite routine event to see
the congressmen convicted and put in jail. Even the all-mighty Enron was
brought down to its knee. Over 1000 government employees were
convicted by the FBI just in the last one or two years. Thus, it would be
useful to find out how the procurement practices are carried out at the
government level in Nepal. How transparent are these bidding practices?
Do we have any civilian oversight? Do we have any whistleblower law in
Nepal? It would also be interesting to find out about the internal bidding
mechanism of the government tender.
(Alok Bohara)
A ‘cultural’ dimension is either ignored or misunderstood in the PSD
discourse even though Nepal’s international competitive advantage
draws profoundly on it.
Mallika Shakya has written a lucid essay on the issues relevant for drafting
a workable strategy of Private Sector Development (PSD) in a transitional
Nepal. She has pointed her finger at the interventions required to address
the "ethnic and gender concerns without self destructive compromises on
market rigor". Since the redress of ethnic and gender concerns would
definitely distort the market in some ways it is here that I am not
comfortable with her prognosis though I would very much like to agree
entirely with her because the concerns are genuine. It is not that there is
any argument with the politico-economic agenda of inclusive democracy;
it is the question of strategy which is a matter of debate. Though the
country’s politics has visibly veered towards far left, there is no point in
developing a strategy of PSD for an extreme left regime that would give
no role to the private sector. A realistic PSD strategy has to dovetail into
the socio-economic agenda of the liberal left; otherwise the whole exercise
could turn into idle play of words. Small pillars of the economy like micro
credit and cooperative initiatives, I am sure, would fit seamlessly into the
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new scheme of things, so the stress would naturally go in that direction.
But, as the author has rightly stated, there are some sectors where inducing
bigger investments would require a totally different approach.
(Keshav Upadhyay)
While I totally agree with being cautious and preventing gender/ethnic
inclusion from distorting the market, yet cultural capital can be a real
potential for Nepal where branding the cultural/geographic products
(handicraft, tourism and specialty goods like tea, coffee and carpets) for
global niche markets is one of the most promising avenues for
international competitiveness. At the moment, Nepal does this task
haphazardly and is not very successful at it. One example comes to mind
is that of a Bahun and a State bureaucrat trying to sell the ancient Sherpa
heritage to elite culture connoisseurs without knowing one Sherpa word.
The same Bahun can do it much better only if he is prepared to invest a
couple of years learning about the Sherpa culture/history and another
couple of years understanding the international clientele he is trying to
serve.
Let me state another small example. One of the most important of Nepal’s
export is traditional handicraft. Here, by being ethnically insensitive, the
State is losing out a lot. Over 85 per cent of the members of the Handicraft
Association of Nepal (HAN) are Newar traditional artisans. But, their
programs for developing international certification, copyrights, and
marketing are extremely haphazard, because the State does not
appropriately recognize ethnic skills. The State definition of expertise ends
at formal mainstream school education. As a result, a superb master of
statue-making fails to get government accreditation as a trainer/certifier if
he/she does not have a diploma, although that is irrelevant for the area of
expertise. What this has meant then is that a secretive, uncoded,
monopolized, and hence rudimentary system of accreditation tightly
controls the statue-making enterprise, which is a total loss for both the
artisans and the State. The government can solve such a problem by
offering more ethnically nuanced accreditation/training system, which on
the one hand, will lead to formalization and hence wider access to ethnic
skills, and on the other hand, will lead to better recognition to ethnic
identities in society.
India has developed very sophisticated classical art academies which give
credit to the masters of those arts, while giving a wide range of people
access to those arts. Classical arts have helped tremendously in building an
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international brand of India and in marketing of not only specialty goods
such as tea and herbs but also heavy products such as Indian airlines and
IT services. Cultural capital is very much part of the India brand. I also
believe that exploiting the potentials of cultural capital is healthier than a
myopic focus on distribution at the expense of economic growth. While
societies will continue to negotiate the shares of the pie, it is also
important that each of the shares also contribute creatively towards
making the pie bigger.
(Mallika Shakya)
Other MSME issues: micro-credit, community forestry and remittance
mobilization have been overshadowed by ‘bigger’ issues of FDI and
hydropower
First of all, one must appreciate the silent revolution on grass roots
economic front that is going on in Nepal since the days of small farmer
development program. Then there came Community Forestry. These
innovations must be accredited to the government initiative. Right from
the 1990s people have sprang up themselves which saw the mushrooming
of self-serving community-based organizations (CBOs) which are still
growing on with their saving and credit schemes.
In recent months, I am having several sessions with Dr. Harihar Dev Pant,
Chairperson, NIRDHAN, in promoting One Product One Village (OPOV)
in Bara-Parsa terai sections. As Nirdhan is contributing to micro-credit to
poor lot in ten districts including these two, the need for graduating the
micro-credit takers to micro-enterprise is the idea behind the concept of
OPOV. Nirdhan will promote three micro enterprise centers with a plan I
should be facilitating in terms of center identification, market linked
product identification and entrepreneurs identification.
(Dileep Adhikary)
Another interesting development in Nepal has been the inflow of
remittances. It is widely believed that, because of limited opportunities for
investment in real capital, this has ended up either raising the price of real
estate or giving some desired consumption boost among poor households.
What institutional development will help to induce much of the remittance
money toward growth of the rural economy? Is it feasible, for instance, to
translate remittances into MFI loans?
(Mukti Upadhyay)
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I very much agree with MuktiJi that the flow of remittance and flow of
people might give us a unique window of opportunity in this regard. Does
the State have a vision?
(Mallika Shakya)
4. PSD, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL ISSUES
Private sector’s role in provision of educational services remains
controversial …
The new political development has increasingly put the PSD under
uncertainty. Though there is a realization that private sector is necessary,
the likely inequality is taken as a political ploy for its rejection to
backstage. Thus, there is also a need for strong analytical article showing
enough evidence that the overall inequality does not negate the equality
well at the higher level even for lower quintile groups ensuring better
livelihood status. Further, the social protection measures compensate for
and ensure the social service delivery reasonably at the higher level. The
service delivery could even be better than that in socialistic economies.
PSD also needs to highlight the public private partnerships in social
service delivery so as to impress upon the general public that the profit
motivated private sector will not leave the social service delivery behind.
They are very much essential to be highlighted to stop the temptation to go
for direct service delivery by the government machinery rather than
through more market friendly measures.
Successful PSD assumes the existence of well developed regulatory
system, and the role of the government’s role in evolving such a rule based
system needs to be highlighted to impress upon the populace that the
government is not sitting silent and doing nothing before the market
forces. It will give an impression that the government is fully aware of the
concerns of disadvantaged communities and poorer section of the society
and only thing is that such policies are to be market friendly. Let the
government be smart enough in giving the message strongly that
unleashing the private sector does not and will not lead to overlook the
concerns of poorer section of the society.
The dislike for private schools and colleges in the name of more equal
education (or equal opportunity to the education facilities) and in the face
of limited public resource availability speaks these confusion and
contradictions. Despite private schools sharing the obligation of the
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government in the drive for universal school education, in the absence of
strong and effective regulatory mechanisms, private schools are also
despised for brewing inequality in the society. How do we address this
issue in the role of government in PSD?
(Bhuban B. Bajracharya)
Historically, education has been the best equalizer in many societies. Even
the world capital of free market, America, provides free education up to
the high school level for all of its citizens: rich, poor, whites, and nonwhites. In Nepali case, despite much progress in the private education
sector in the post-1990 democratic era, a dangerous segregation is taking
place between the rich and the poor in the education sector. Wealthy
families have access to high quality education offered by expensive
private schools and colleges, whereas a vast majority of poor and
disadvantaged students are stuck in the ailing public education sector.
The new government’s attempt to chart a new educational strategy is a
welcome sign. But, in the name of reform, imposing quotas, price control
or nationalization will all be counter productive, and these overly
restrictive regulations (especially banning or nationalization the private
educational enterprise as proposed by the Maoists) are not the answer. The
recent governmental ordinance, for example, requiring students to seek
governmental permission from the Ministry of Education to go abroad for
studies is an example of populist desperation rather than a sound policy
prescription.
In addition to having a capital flight to India, such policies will also
deteriorate in-school services. It will discourage innovations and Nepali
ingenuity in the production of education, which has been a hallmark of the
post-1990 democratic era. The point is that a healthy private sector can be
constructive in helping the public sector, and in my recommendation, I am
drawing upon my proposal which argues for a trust fund to strike that
balance.
The proposed system of trust fund uses five percent tax from the total
revenue generated by the private schools and colleges (i.e., all higher
institutions). There are 1.5 million students in eighty-five hundreds private
schools, and 70,000 students go to about 250 private colleges. Using a
conservative amount of Rs 1,500 as a monthly charge, the five percent tax
revenue will yield about Rs 1.413 billion for the trust fund. The second
portion of the trust fund relies on a ten percent levy –about Rs 1 billion-82
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from the sin taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and casinos. [These are good faith
guesstimates.]
Jointly, the five-plus-ten tax system can raise Rs 2.413 billion worth for
the trust fund. Both sectors, being on the target list of the Maoists, should
not mind contributing five and ten percent of their revenues respectively to
this noble cause. In return, the government and the agitating student
organizations should not be imposing unfair regulatory controls on them.
The proposal then argues for allocating these monies to the graduates of
the public schools for their higher-level education, including the
vocational trainings.
(Alok Bohara)
It is a common knowledge that political parties have used schools and
colleges as a training ground to groom young party activists. In addition,
the Maoists have heavily interfered in the past years with the operations of
even secondary schools and have argued for nationalization of primary
and secondary schools.
Perhaps the most important criterion of measuring success of PSD in
Nepal (at least in the near and mid-term) would be its impact on
employment generation. For this, our educational system should be able to
produce human resources that serve the need of the private sector. To
better match supply with demand, I have argued for active involvement of
private sector in developing and running a system of post-secondary
vocational and training schools for producing mid-level technicians (read
my views posted under “designated discussants’ comments”).
Participants with insights into the educational sector of Nepal could
enlighten us with their valuable perspectives on the role of the government
in promoting private sector participation in expanding schooling and
educational system in Nepal.
(Vijaya Sharma)
I agree with Prof Bohara on the need for Education Trust Fund. There are
certain disciplines such as medicine which have become simply expensive
beyond the reach of even middle income families. We need to introduce
various funding mechanisms to facilitate access of students from
disadvantaged and low-income brackets to the education opportunities
particularly higher education.
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Private sector is coming up in many spheres of education including those
in teachers’ training and vocational and skill development. There again
comes the role of government in PSD in education - that of ensuring
standards and quality, once again a question of having well regulated
system. With foreign employment expanding and its importance not
waning in foreseeable future, vocational and technical education can be
promoted for the skills required for such foreign employment.
With increasing number of educational institutions providing foreign
degrees in the country (such as Cambridge A syllabus) and definitely they
being in the private sector, there is a group strongly pledging to stop this
practice to protect the national education system (SLC, national university
degrees etc.). I think we can deliberate further in some of these interesting
issues.
(Bhuban B. Bajracharya)
I agree with Prof. Bohara’s proposal of a Fund and tapping the
remittances. However, a big problem in education in Nepal is the archaic
mentality of control rather than problem-solving mindset among our
politicians, including the student unions. If you listen carefully to some of
the advisors, Maoists and UML, they would allow private sector neither in
education nor in health. The idea of a Fund is good, given the private
sector is allowed to exist. Fund will be useful only if other aspects of
education are also addressed simultaneously.
There is a big quality gap in the private education system in Nepal. The
curricula and the textbooks of private sector schools cover histories and
issues more relevant to India or developed countries rather than Nepal.
The curricula glorify the countries to where these schooled are linked,
rather than to Nepal’s history and present day realities. All of the private
school education is geared to sending students overseas, teaching their
lifestyles and social patterns. Further, only a few schools go beyond rote
learning. So even if students pass SLC and + 12 with good grades, if they
decide to stay in Nepal, often adjustment becomes a problem for them. A
large chasm is created between them and the ordinary people. Such
students often become misfit in general social environment. Only
advantage they have is their good verbal English. I think this is where the
problem lies. The state should have a good regulatory framework and
capacity to supervise what is being taught and in what way, but in no way
try to impose political partisan view points like in the Communist
countries or under the Panchayat Raj. Politicians should cease to use
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schools as recruitment grounds for their cadres, fill it with their followers
as teachers and use them for party politics. There should be a law to ban
recruitment of school children not only in army but also their use for party
demonstrations.
One more issue pertinent for school education is the role of communitymanaged schools. They could replace the private schools in competition
itself given proper environment. The snag is that while parents and
students are willing to pay 10 times more for private education, levy of
even minimum charges by the community/public schools faces strong
opposition, inflamed by politicians. The VDCs could pay for really those
unable to pay even the minimum in community/public schools from this
Fund. Community schools can probably do a better job on this front.
(Meena Acharya)
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Appendices
Appendix 1
E-seminar Theme
Nepal is at the outset of a historic political transformation which will call
for a radical change in the governance structure. Domestically, we have
witnessed a call for greater social and gender inclusion. Internationally, we
are only beginning to appreciate the rapidly unfolding Shining India and
Roaring China phenomena. What will this mean for the industrial policies
and institutions in New Nepal?
Institutionally, which regulatory procedures, institutions and policies can
and should adapt to the new demands of domestic populism and
international marketism? Sectorally, what should be the new State policy
towards the ‘old’ giants of agriculture vis-a-vis newly evolving sectors of
services and manufacturing? As the State undergoes a national
reconstruction process, what role should the private sector play in the tall
order of infrastructure-building and global integration? And is there a
politico-economic
nexus
in
private
sector
development?
E-Seminar Timeline
The seminar starts with a paper authored by Ms. Mallika Shakya of
London School Economics. Within two weeks, the designated discussants
will send their comments. By February 15, the paper and the comments
will be available for public viewing and for comments and questions from
all. The e-seminar ends on February 28th. Those interested in participating
as a part of the e-audience in the listserv will have to send you name and
email by February 10 (see below for details).
The paper and the discussions and comments will appear later in a special
edition of the e-journal Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin.
How do I participate?
You can participate in the e-seminar in various ways.
1) You can send your name and email as an interested participant if you
would like to raise a question, or make comments on the paper itself or on
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ensuing discussion. Your email, which will not be made public, and your
name should be sent to Bishal KC: bishalkc@gmail.com, preferably by
February 10. It will be entered in a temporary listserv which will be
deactivated upon completion of the seminar, on February 28. Your
participation within the e-seminar listserv deliberation is completely
voluntary. Your substantial contribution and thoughtful writing could be
displayed on the web with some editing if necessary (see: Access to
Papers, Comments, & Deliberations)
2) Alternatively, you can check the seminar display board periodically and
send your question and/or contribution to the moderator through a simple
submission mechanism (see: Access to Papers, Comments, &
Deliberations).
Collaborating Partners
This is a first of its kind e-seminar organized for the Liberal Democracy
Nepal (LDN) in collaboration with the Nepal Study Center at the
University of New Mexico. Liberal Democracy Nepal (LDN) is dedicated
to disseminating and discussing the full range of political economy issues
and ideas germane to the ideal of creating liberal democracy in Nepal.
LDN is an affiliate of Nepal Study Center at the University of New
Mexico, USA.
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Appendix 2: e-Seminar Organization Team

Ms. Mallika Shakya is PhD candidate with London School of Economics
(LSE) and is currently with the World Bank, where she has led publicprivate dialogues on trade, industrial innovation, and gender.
Dr. Vijaya R. Sharma, Faculty in the Economics Department of
University of Colorado. He was an active member of the task force to
prepare the Seventh Five-Year Industrial Development Plan in Nepal and
the 1987 Industrial Policy.
Dr. Bhola Chalise is the Chairman, Board of Directors of Rastriya
Banijya Bank, the largest commercial bank in Nepal. He is a former
government permanent secretary and holds his PhD from University of
Vienna, Austria.
Mr. Krishna Gyawali is a Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, and
has spent over two decades in Nepal Civil Service. He was recently a
Hubert Humphrey Fellow, and worked as a consultant with the World
Bank in Washington DC.
Mr. Sujeev Shakya is the President of Tara Management Private Limited,
an investment and management company that manages diversified
portfolio of businesses along with Bhotekoshi Power Company, Nepal’s
first Independent Power Producer and Surya Fund, Nepal’s first private
equity fund.
Mr. Prachanda Man Shrestha is Joint Secretary in the Ministry of
Industry Commerce and Supplies, and has 32 years long civil service
experience in the government of Nepal. He has led high-level Nepali
delegations on various international platforms, including on issues of
international trade and tourism.
Mr. Jagadish Upadhyay is an independent consultant on development
programs, currently focusing on public health. He is a former official of
Nepal’s Planning Commission (1962-1971) and of the World Bank (19712003).
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Dr. Mukti Upadhyay is an associate professor of economics at Eastern
Illinois University. He specializes in development economics with a focus
on macro and international aspects of development.
Dr. Alok K. Bohara is a professor of economics at the University of New
Mexico (UNM), and the founder of the Nepal Study Center at UNM. His
research focus is in the areas of environment and development and their
relationships with poverty and conflict.
Mr. Prakash Adhikari is a doctoral student in political science at the
University of New Mexico.
Mr. Naresh Nepal is a doctoral student in economics at the University of
New Mexico
Mr. Bishal K.C. is a computer science professional and resides in
Washington DC.

89

Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2007
Appendix 3.
List of Participants
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Aditya Jha
Alok K. Bohara Dr.
Ambika P. Adhikari Dr.
Anju Sharma
Anup Pahari Dr.
Bhola Chalise Dr.
Bhuban B Bajracharya
Bimal Koirala Dr.
Bishwambher Pyakuryal Dr.
Biswo Poudel
Dharm Bhawuk Dr.
Dharmedra Dhakal Dr.
Gaury S Adhikary Dr.
Girija Gautam
Gyan Pradhan Dr.
Hari Bansh Jha Dr.
Jagadish Pokharel Dr.
Jagadish Upadhyay
Jeet Joshee Dr.
Jeff Drope Dr.
Jiba Lamichane
Jugal Bhurtel Dr.
Kamal Upadhyaya Dr.
Keshav Acharya
Keshav Upadhyay
Krishna Gyawali
Kul C Gautam
Laxman Devkota Dr.
Madhu Ghimire Dr.
Mahendra Lawoti Dr.
Meena Acharya Dr.
Mukti Upadhyay Dr.
Nabina Shrestha
Narayan Khadka Dr.
Naresh Koirala
Prachanda Man Shrestha
Pradip Upadhyay Dr.
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•
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•

Pramod Mishra Dr.
Puru Subedi
Radhesh Pant Dr.
Raghab Pant Dr.
Ramjee Parajulee Dr.
Ravi Bhandari Dr.
Roger Adhikari
Sailesh Tiwari
Samanta Thapa Dr.
Shankar Sharma Dr.
Sharda Thapa
Shyam Karki Dr.
Sujeev Shakya
Suman Timsina
Surya P Subedi Dr.
Tara Niraula Dr.
Vijaya R Sharma Dr.
Yuba Raj Khatiwada Dr.
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Appendix 4.
Guidelines for Collaborators, Contributors and Moderators
Introduction
Nepal Study Center (NSC) at the University of New Mexico conducts
research, undertakes collaborative projects to promote research and
education, and runs annual policy research conference, among other
things. The aim is to help understand the underlying issues in
development, democracy, conflict, and the environment as they relate to
the Himalayan region and the countries in South Asia. Development is
broadly defined to include health, education, environment, natural
resource management, governance, equity, information technology,
poverty, socio-economic strives, and micro and macro economic activities.
To that end, it has developed an e-conference portal to conduct seminars
on the internet within a structured environment. The idea is to bring
scholars and interested participants from all over the world to a common
platform for an informed deliberation. The first NSC/LDN e-seminar was
conducted by the Liberal Democracy Nepal (LDN): e-Seminar No 1
2007 in collaboration with the NSC using this portal.
Scope of the E-Seminar Theme
The e-seminar topics need to have a broader policy implication, and the
issue should be dealt in a thematically deep and rigorous manner. NSC
expects collaborating scholars and experts involved in the e-seminar to 1)
lead the discussion, 2) moderate and edit deliberations, and 3) be involved
in the preparation of the proceeding.
Interested parties can contact the Nepal Study Center for such
collaborative projects. A typical e-seminar can last for about 2 to 4 weeks,
and the final output is published as a proceeding in one of the two journals
of the NSC (HJDD or LDNB). A basic structure and the ground rules are
given below.
Basic Ground Rules and Logistics
Email Privacy: To avoid spam and also due to some requests, every effort
will be made not to make the participants’ emails public during or after the
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deliberation. Email address of the e-seminar members within the listserv
group deliberation will be kept hidden. It is up to the e-seminar members
to reveal their individual email address as a part of their name signature.
We do require however that the deliberating members sign their
submissions with the name and a line or two about the profession and/ or
the professional affiliation.
Access to Papers and Seminar Deliberations: All the papers, comments,
and deliberations from the e-seminar floor will be posted by the
moderators publicly on the NSC’s e-seminar display and archival site.
E-seminar listserv etiquette: Participants are expected to be issue oriented,
focused on the seminar topic, show civility, and be courteous to each
other. The e-seminar discussion forum (within the listserv exchanges) may
not be used for personal greetings and non-seminar related queries and
other postings.
Role of Moderators: The e-seminar moderators will reserve the right to
remove postings that are not relevant to the topic under discussion.
Because of the amount of work involved, we encourage at least two
individuals to act as co-moderators. Moderators shall make every attempt
to post the comments/contributions at least once a day.
Moderators are required to maintain quality of deliberation by being alert
and engaging. Moderators may also have to screen and/or edit the
submitted comments especially during the second week of the floor
deliberation before it goes for the public posting. Moderators also reserve
the right to exercise their discretion and take actions, if necessary, to
facilitate the smooth running of the e-seminar.
E-seminar Operational Structure
There are three phases in this e-seminar structure: initial preparation (1/2
weeks), deliberations (1/2 weeks), and publication of the proceedings (1/2
week). Some minor modification could be negotiated between the
collaborating partners.
Initial Preparation (1/2 weeks)
Interested collaborating partners should contact the Nepal Study Center
with 1) seminar topic, and 2) a tentative list of scholarly panelists. Prior to
starting the actual e-seminar deliberations, presenter’s papers are made
available to discussants, and the discussants provide their comments
before a certain deadline (typically in two weeks).
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The length and the number of papers to be considered for the e-seminar
deliberation will depend on the topic and the panelists. Apart from the
individual papers, they will as an opening statement: (i) introduce the
theme, (ii) lay out relevant issues and questions, and (iii) set the frame for
the e-discussion. The length of the comments from the discussants is
flexible, but needs to be crisp and focused on the presenter’s presented
theme and papers.
E-Seminar Deliberations (1/2 weeks)
Typically an e-seminar on a particular topic may last for up to two weeks.
The deliberative phase can be broken into two sections.
Phase I: Interactive Deliberation
First week/Panelists: E-seminar begins with the simultaneous posting of
the papers and the discussants’ comments. (The requirement of
simultaneity may be relaxed). The panel (presenters and the discussants)
deliberates and provide rejoinders by using the listserv based email
exchanges. The deliberated materials are collected, edited (if needed), by
the moderators and made available for viewing. The deliberation can be
confined to the panel members for this phase. Other registered
participating members of the e- listserv group can view the discussions
and take notes.
Phase II: Floor Discussion
Second week/Question-Answer from the Floor: The floor opens for
questioning, and the e-participants are encouraged to present their views
and ask questions for the panel. Engagement is voluntary however. The
deliberated materials out of the e-seminar floor within the e-seminar
listserv group will be edited for quality consistency and made available for
public viewing.
During these two weeks, the moderators will regularly post contributions
emerging from the e-discussion out on the web for public viewing, and
they will also entertain submissions from others from around the world
who may be following the e-seminar discussions on the web. (See: Access
to Papers, Comments, & Deliberations)
The time frame between the phase I and phase II could be adjusted by the
moderators. Typically by the end of the second week, the e-seminar ends.
The listserv created for a particular e-seminar is disabled.
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Publication and Dissemination of e-seminar proceedings (1/2 weeks)
A special e-seminar proceeding can be prepared by the guest editors (e.g.,
some members of the panelists), and may be submitted for publication in
the Nepal Study Center’s e-journals Liberal Democracy Nepal (LDNB)
journal, or Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy
(HJDD). But the quality of the proceeding must be assured by the eseminar moderators and the guest editors. This platform will also try to
archive past e-seminar deliberations.
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Appendix 5
Nepal Study Center: was established at the University of New Mexico
two years ago with an objective to promote policy research activities
related to the Himalayan region, Nepal, and the countries in South Asia.
NSC takes this policy research theme broadly to include issues related to
development, democracy, governance, conflict and the environment. NSC
is dedicated to creating platforms to enhance knowledge sharing.
NSC’s research capacity-building activities include two e-journal
publications (Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy and
Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin), the annual Himalayan Policy
Research Conference, e-seminars, and maintaining an electronic
repository to allow scholars to upload, store, and disseminate policy
research. For details: http://nepalstudycenter.unm.edu
Liberal Democracy Nepal:
is dedicated to deliberating and
disseminating the full range of issues and ideas dedicated to the ideal of
creating liberal democracy in Nepal. Based at the Nepal Study Center at
University of New Mexico, LDN is a forum consisting of scholars,
professionals, and policy practioners. Issues of fundamentals reforms and
political economy are addressed in the Mission and Theme section. In
summary, LDN focuses on:
1. Showcasing, deliberating, disseminating, and archiving relevant papers,
proceedings and reports on contemporary topics related to socio-economic
issues, fundamental reforms, state restructuring, and political economy
that are of importance in promoting liberal democracy in Nepal
2. Conducting seminars and workshops, and publishing selected
contributions, articles, discussion materials, and constructive comments in
Liberal Democracy Nepal Bulletin (LDNB) journal published by the
Nepal Study Center
3. Networking with scholars and professionals in Nepal for joint
collaborations and deliberations in areas related to fostering liberal
democracy in Nepal. For details: http://www.liberaldemocracynepal.org
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